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For years, courts and commentators have struggled with the
criminal strict liability doctrine.1 It is a doctrine that contradicts the
most basic principles of modem criminal law.2 Ordinarily, a crimi-
nal offense requires both a voluntary act (actus reus) and a culpable
state of mind (mens rea).3 Strict liability permits the conviction of a
criminal defendant in the absence of mens rea.4 In ignoring the de-
fendant's intent,5 the strict liability doctrine even allows for punish-
I See, e.g., HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968)
[hereinafter PACKER, LIMITS]; Anthony A. Cuomo, Mens Rea and Status Criminality, 40 S.
CAL. L. REV. 463 (1967); Gary V. Dubin, Mens Rea Reconsidered A Plea for a Due Process
Concept of Criminal Responsibility, 18 STAN. L. REV. 322 (1966); JamesJ. Hippard, The Un-
constitutionality of Criminal Liability Without Fault: An Argument for a Constitutional Doctrine of
Mens Rea, 10 Hous. L. REV. 1039 (1973); R. M. Jackson, Absolute Prohibition in Statutory
Offences, 6 CAMBRIDGE LJ. 83 (1936-38); Phillip E. Johnson, Strict Liability: The Prevalent
View, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME &JUST. 1518-21 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983); San-
ford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 257 (1987); Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea
and the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 107 [hereinafter Packer, Mens Real; G.L. Peiris,
Strict Liability in Commonwealth Criminal Law, 3 LEGAL STUD. 117 (1983); Rollin M. Perkins,
Criminal Liability Without Fault: A Disquieting Trend, 68 IowA L. REV. 1067 (1983); Alan
Saltzman, Strict Criminal Liability and the United States Constitution: Substantive Criminal Law
Due Process, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1571 (1978); Francis B. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33
COLUM. L. REV. 55 (1933); Richard G. Singer, The Resurgence ofMens Rea: III-The Rise
and Fall of Strict Criminal Liability, 30 B.C. L. REV. 337 (1989); Richard A. Wasserstrom,
Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. REV. 731 (1960); Joseph Yahuda, Mens Rea
in Statutory Offences, 118 NEw LJ. 330 (1968); Note, Constitutionality of Criminal Statutes
Containing No Requirement ofMens Rea, 24 IND. L.J. 89 (1948); Claire D. Johnson, Note,
Strict Liability Crimes, 33 NEB. L. REV. 462 (1954); William J. Sloan, Note, The Development
of Crimes Requiring No Criminal Intent, 26 MARq. L. REV. 92 (1942).
2 See Kadish, supra note 1, at 267; John C. Jeffries, Jr. & Paul B. Stephan III, De-
fenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325, 1373-74
(1979).
3 See Gerhard O.W. Mueller, On Common Law Mens Rea, 42 MINN. L. REV. 1043,
1052 (1958).
4 See Jackson, supra note 1, at 83; see also Saltzman, supra note 1, at 1577 ("Strict
criminal liability is often referred to as liability without mens rea."). By definition, strict
liability "means no requirement of mens rea; i.e., no guilty knowledge or evil or wrongful
purpose; it means, in some circumstances, that a criminal prosecution may take place
where the defendant does not even know the facts which result in criminal liability."
Robert J. Jossen, Strict Liability in Criminal Cases-The Present Day Implications of Dot-
terweich and Park, in MENS REA: STATE OF MIND DEFENSES IN CRIMINAL AND CIVIL FRAUD
CASES 33, 35 (Stanley S. Arkin &John R. Wing eds., 1985).
5 See Note, Developments in the Law, Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior
Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1262 (1979) ("The Supreme Court
has declared that no inquiry into the intent of the actor is required to establish liability
under these statutes, only a finding that the defendant's conduct or neglect constitutes a
proximate cause of the alleged violation.").
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ment of individuals who, because of deception, unwittingly commit
prohibited acts. 6 Not surprisingly, many scholars are critical of the
doctrine.7 Commenting on the imposition of liability without re-
gard to the defendant's state of mind, Professor Kadish stated, "If a
principle is at work here, it is the principle of 'tough luck.' "8
Yet, arguments against criminal strict liability have not con-
vinced everyone.9 In particular, prosecutors and legislators wel-
come the use of strict liability crimes. 10 Convictions are more easily
obtained if the prosecution need not prove a culpable mental state.
Intent, often the most difficult issue to prove,11 must be shown indi-
6 See Jackson, supra note 1, at 88 ("Where absolute liability has been created, and
there are no statutory defences or the defendant does not come within them, evidence
that the defendant acted in good faith and took reasonable care is useless as a defence
although it may properly be given in mitigation of the penalty."); see, e.g., United States
v. Kantor, 677 F. Supp. 1421 (C.D. Cal. 1987) , aff'd sub nom., United States v. United
States Dist. Court, 858 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1988) (defendants misled as to legal age of
female seeking to be employed as actress in pornographic film); Noble v. State, 223
N.E.2d 755 (Ind. 1967) (defendant, employed in state automobile license office, was
convicted of making false attestation as notary when she falsely notarized document
while following long-standing office procedures under supervisor's direction); State v.
Gould, 40 Iowa 372 (1875) (defendant convicted of obstructing a highway after building
a fence based on a survey made by a county surveyor); Commonwealth v. Olskefski, 64
Pa. D. & C. 343 (Montour County Ct. 1948) (truck driver convicted of driving an over-
loaded truck on the highway even though he had innocently and justifiably relied upon
an erroneous weight certificate issued by a state licensed weight master); see also City of
West Allis v. Megna, 133 N.W.2d 252 (Wis. 1965) (tavern operator convicted for permit-
ting a minor to loiter in his tavern. Tavern operator relied on false identification card
presented on previous occasion and minor's mature appearance. Court stated that even
if false identification was present on date of offense, tavern operator would be strictly
liable).
7 See Francis A. Allen, The Morality of Means: Three Problems in Criminal Sanctions, 42
U. Prrr. L. REv. 737, 742-48 (1981) (arguing that the imposition of strict criminal liabil-
ity in economic regulation cases contradicts the "morality of means," which concerns
the propriety of methods in achieving social ends); Cuomo, supra note 1, at 516-22 (criti-
cizing criminal strict liability as irrational and inadequate for retributive, deterrent, reha-
bilitative, and incapacitative purposes); Hippard, supra note 1, at 1040 (urging the
unconstitutionality of strict criminal liability); Packer, Mens Rea, supra note 1, at 109 (as-
serting the irrationality of strict criminal liability); Perkins, supra note 1, at 106 (arguing
that imprisonment in absence of fault violates 8th and 14th Amendments); Saltzman,
supra note 1, at 1574 (urging rejection of criminal strict liability as unconstitutional); cf.
Richard A. Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL SruD. 205 (1973) (arguing that
civil strict liability without contributory negligence defense is inefficient). In fact, the
dominant view appears to be that in the Anglo-American culture, the use of strict liabil-
ity crimes is arbitrary and unreasonable. Mark Kelman, Strict Liability: An Unorthodox
View, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME &JusT. 1512-18 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983).
8 Kadish, supra note 1, at 267.
9 See James B. Brady, Strict Liability Offenses: A Justification, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 217
(1972); Ingeborg Paulus, Strict Liability: Its Place in Public Welfare Offences, 20 CRIM. L.Q.
445 (1977-78); Steven S. Nemerson, Note, Criminal Liability Without Fault: A Philosophical
Perspective, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1517 (1975).
10 Indeed, an increasing trend to use strict liability crimes exists. See Perkins, supra
note 1, at 1068-70 (1983); see also infra note 76.
11 Commonwealth v. Smith, 44 N.E. 503, 504 (Mass. 1896).
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rectly from a defendant's statements and conduct. 12 Application of
criminal strict liability relieves the state of this burden. The strict
liability doctrine affords both an efficient and nearly guaranteed way
to convict defendants.
Caught in the middle of this dispute are the trial courts. While
judges wish to uphold legislative intent and enforce the laws as en-
acted, they must also confront, face-to-face, individual strict liability
defendants for whom punishment simply is not warranted.' 3 Trial
judges may find it hard to imprison, even for a short period, a per-
son who has not committed a crime intentionally. 14
Presently, the strict liability doctrine operates as an irrebuttable
presumption. 15 Once an individual is shown to have committed an
impermissible act, the law presumes some level of culpable intent
justifying punishment. ' 6 This basic presumption, however, is not al-
ways valid. Sometimes a defendant will face several years in jail de-
spite having taken extraordinary efforts to comply with the law. 17 In
these situations, the irrebuttable presumption will unjustly convict
an individual who is not criminally culpable. Because the defendant
took all reasonable preventive steps and was still unaware of the un-
12 SEVENTH CIRCUIT JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS, MANUAL
ONJURY INSTRUCTIONS IN FED. CRIM. CASES § 4.04, reprinted in 33 F.R.D. 523, 550 (Wal-
terJ. La Buy, Chairman 1963).
13 Judge Marvin E. Frankel's article, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 4-
10 (1972), describes the personal nature of the sentencing process in punishing a defen-
dant, especially when the sentencing judge is granted broad discretion.
14 See infra part II.C for a discussion of certain acts punishable as strict liability
crimes that do not warrant sanctions under traditional principles of retribution and
deterrence.
15 See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw § 9.3.2, at 716 (1978);
Norman Abrams, Criminal Liability of Corporate Officers for Strict Liability Offenses-A Comment
on Dotterweich and Park, 28 UCLA L. REV. 463, 466 (1981); Mueller, supra note 3, at
1092.
16 Packer, Mens Rea, supra note 1, at 140. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
fostered a misperception that culpability is irrelevant because of the absence of severe
punishment. In Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952), the Court identified
strict liability crimes as public welfare offenses where the "penalties commonly are rela-
tively small, and conviction does no grave damage to an offender's reputation." Id at
256. Where minimal sanctions are imposed, Morissette permits courts to construe stat-
utes as dispensing with the requirement of guilty intent.
17 See supra note 6. Many strict liability statutes set forth severe punishment which,
if a good faith defense is not recognized, may be imposed. See, e.g., United States v.
Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922) (strict liability narcotics charge; five year maximum sen-
tence); United States v. Kantor, 677 F. Supp. 1421 (C.D. Cal. 1987), aff'd sub nom, United
States v. United States Dist. Court, 858 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1988) (strict liability pornog-
raphy charge; 10 year maximum sentence); People v. Keating, No. BA 025236 (Super.
Ct. Cal. 1991) (strict liability securities fraud charge; five year maximum sentence); State
v. Quinn, 59 So. 913 (La. 1912) (strict liability bribery charge; five year maximum sen-
tence); State v. Lindberg, 215 P. 41 (Wash. 1923) (strict liability bank loan charge; 10
year maximum sentence); States v. Hennessy, 195 P. 211 (Wash. 1921) (strict liability
criminal syndicalism charge; five year maximum sentence).
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lawful nature of his conduct, traditional purposes of punishment
would not be served by prosecuting this individual.18
This Article proposes an alternative to the irrebuttable pre-
sumption-a good faith defense to strict liability crimes. By defini-
tion, the good faith defense would reinsert the issue of mens rea
into certain criminal strict liability cases. In limited cases, defend-
ants could attempt to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that they
operated under an honest and reasonable mistake of fact because
they took affirmative steps to comply with the law but were misled in
their efforts. 19 The good faith defense would reintroduce mens rea,
not as an element that the prosecution must prove for conviction,
but as an element a defendant must disprove for acquittal.
Those favoring the strict liability doctrine may worry that the
good faith defense will transform all strict liability trials into dis-
putes over defendants' intent. However, certain important limita-
tions on the defense would minimize this concern. First, the good
faith defense would impose a heavy burden of proof-beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. This high burden would ensure that individuals
committing prohibited strict liability acts will be punished. The
prosecution would remain free from its ordinary burden of proving
a culpable mens rea. Second, the proposed defense would be lim-
ited to crimes involving incarceration. The defense would not be
available for strict liability offenses punishable only by fines. Incar-
ceration, with its unique effects on both the defendant's liberty and
status in the community, requires moral culpability.20
Adoption of the good faith defense necessitates a reexamina-
tion of traditional concepts of American criminal jurisprudence.
The defense requires a shift in our ordinary approach to burden of
proof,21 as well as a broader understanding of the nature of strict
liability offenses. 22 Nonetheless, this Article demonstrates that the
good faith defense is neither a radical nor unprincipled step. Not
only do foreign countries routinely apply the good faith defense 23
but even conservative members of American courts consider it an
18 Kelman, supra note 7, at 1515.
19 See infra part III.B.
20 See Packer, Mens Rea, supra note 1, at 150 ("The combination of stigma and loss
of liberty involved in a conditional or absolute sentence of imprisonment sets that sanc-
tion apart from anything else the law imposes.").
21 Ordinarily, the prosecution bears the burden of proving each element of the of-
fense beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
22 Strict liability has been defined as "criminal liability without negligence as to an
element of the offense .... Saltzman, supra note 1, at 1576. The good faith defense
essentially transforms a strict liability crime into a negligence offense, in which the de-
fendant must prove reasonable conduct under the circumstances. See infra part III.A.
23 See infra part III.A.
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alternative to traditional strict liability doctrine.24 Important strict
liability prosecutions, such as the Traci Lords child pornography
case 25 and the trial of Lincoln Savings and Loan Association presi-
dent Charles Keating, 26 illustrate the need to develop an alternative
to our current approach to strict liability crimes. The good faith
defense offers a proven and viable alternative.
Part One of this Article examines United States v. Kantor.27 This
case affords an overview of criminal strict liability and the arguments
both for and against it. More importantly, Kantor is a rare example
of an American court relying on a good faith defense.
Part Two looks more closely at the strict liability doctrine. The
discussion comprises three sections. The first section reviews from
a theoretical perspective the rationales for the strict liability doc-
trine. The second section scrutinizes these rationales and identifies
the theoretical and practical problems associated with the strict lia-
bility doctrine. The third section addresses traditional judicial alter-
natives employed to avoid the harsh effects of strict liability and
discusses why these alternatives do not deal successfully with the
recognized inequities of the strict liability doctrine.
Part Three of this Article proposes a solution. It reviews the
approaches that. foreign countries use to reconcile the strict liability
debate. It then contrasts these approaches with the traditional
American view of strict liability crimes. Part Three next identifies a
basis in American constitutional law-the right to due process 28 -as
a foundation for adopting a good faith defense in our country. Fi-
nally, Part Three sets forth a model good faith defense that would
accommodate both those interests supporting the strict liability doc-
trine and those interests opposing its application.
I
IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM: UNITED STATES V. KANTOR
A. The Case
While the criminal strict liability doctrine has been applied in
various ways, 29 one of the most provocative cases is United States v.
24 See United States v. United States Dist. Court [Kantor], 858 F.2d 534 (9th Cir.
1988). The opinion was written by Reagan appointee Judge Alex Kozinski, who is de-
scribed as "young, white, male, staunchly conservative, and vehemently anti-Commu-
nist." Susan Rice, Alex Kozinski, L.A. DAILYJ., Sept. 29, 1988, reprinted in 3JUD. PROFiLES.
25 United States v. Kantor, 677 F. Supp. 1421 (C.D. Cal. 1987), aff'd sub nom, United
States v. United States Dist. Court [Kantor], 858 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1988).
26 People v. Keating, No. BA 025236 (Super. Ct. Cal. 1991).
27 Kantor, 677 F. Supp. at 1421.
28 U.S. CoNsT. amends. V, XIV.
29 In a seminal article published in 1933, Professor Sayre listed those public welfare
offenses deemed "strict liability offenses." Sayre, supra note 1, at 73. They included:
406 [Vol. 78:401
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United States District Court for the Central District of California [Kantor].30
The case exemplifies why the strict liability doctrine is used and why
it is opposed. The case is unusual, however, because the court used
a good faith defense to address the problem of incarcerating de-
fendants who, despite their reasonable efforts, were misled into
committing a criminal act.
In 1984, President Ronald Reagan began his "war" against por-
nography.8 ' Shortly thereafter, the federal government charged de-
fendants Kantor and McNee, admitted producers of pornographic
films, with violating the federal child pornography law. This law
prohibits the production of materials depicting a minor 2 engaged
in sexually explicit conduct.8 8 The crime carries a maximum penalty
of ten years in jail.8
4
(1) Illegal sales of intoxicating liquor;,
(a) sales of prohibited beverage;
(b) sales to minors;
(c) sales to habitual drunkards;
(d) sales to Indians or other prohibited persons;
(e) sales by methods prohibited by law;
(2) Sales of impure or adulterated food or drugs;
(a) sales of adulterated or impure milk;
(b) sales of adulterated butter or oleomargarine;
(3) Sales of misbranded articles;
(4) Violations of anti-narcotic acts;
(5) Criminal nuisances;
(a) annoyances or injuries to the public health, safety, repose or
comfort;
(b) obstructions of highways;
(6) Violations of traffic regulations;
(7) Violations of motor-vehicle laws;
(8) Violations of general police regulations, passed for the safety, health
or well-being of the community.
Today this list might also include: child pornography (18 U.S.C. § 2251 (Supp. II
1990)); bank fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1005 (Supp. 111990)); and narcotics transactions involv-
ing minors (21 U.S.C. § 860 (Supp. 11 1990)).
30 858 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1988), aff'g United States v. Kantor, 677 F. Supp. 1421
(C.D. Cal. 1987).
81 When signing the Child Protection Act of 1984 into law, President Reagan
stated: "[Child] pornography is ugly and dangerous. If we do not move against it and
protect our children, then we, as a society, just aren't worth much." Child Protection Act of
1984, Remarks on Signing H.R. 3635 Into Law, 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 743 (May 21,
1984).
82 "Minor"- is defined as "any person under the age of eighteen years." 18 U.S.C.
§ 2255(1) (Supp. IV 1986 & Supp. 11 1990).
33 The Child Protection Act of 1984, the law violated in Kantor, was codified at the
time of the offense at 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (Supp. IV 1986). Despite several minor revisions
and subsequent re-codifications, the law remains substantially the same as that violated
in Kantor. The current codification is 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (Supp. 11 1990).
34 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d) (1988) provides:
(d) Any individual who violates this section shall be fined not more than
$100,000, or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both, but, if such
individual has a prior conviction under this section, such individual
shall be fined not more than $200,000, or imprisoned not less than
five years nor more than 15 years, or both ....
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Defendants Kantor and McNee had employed Traci Lords,3 5 an
underage actress, in several of their pornographic films.3 6 While de-
fendants admitted making the films, they argued they did not know,
and had no reason to believe, that Lords was underage at the time of
production.3 7 Defendants sought to introduce evidence that Lords,
her parents, and her agent made considerable efforts, including pro-
ducing a false birth certificate and driver's license, to deceive de-
fendants into believing that Lords was old enough to make the
films. 38 Additionally, both Lords' physical appearance and reputa-
tion in the industry supported her agent's claim that she was an
adult.39 Based on this evidence, defendants argued it was reason-
able to believe Lords was of legal age when they hired her.
In a motion to preclude any evidence tending to show defend-
ants' mistaken belief about Lords' age, the prosecution argued that
defendants' good faith belief was irrelevant given the strict liability
nature of the crime. 40 Defendants moved to dismiss the charges as
violating their First Amendment rights because of their good faith
belief that they had complied with the law.4 1
The legislative history of the statute indicated that the crime
was "a strict liability offense." 42 Both houses of Congress had origi-
nally drafted bills making it unlawful for any person "knowingly" to
employ, entice, or coerce a minor to engage in sexually explicit con-
duct.43 When the Justice Department protested that the "know-
ingly" requirement would grant defendants a mistake of fact
35 For an earthy discussion of Traci Lords' acting career, see Pat Jordan, Traci Lords
With Her Clothes On, GENTLEMEN'S Q., Apr. 1990, at 250.
36 United States v. Kantor, 677 F. Supp. 1421, 1422-23 (C.D. Cal. 1987), aff'd sub
nom., United States v. United States Dist. Court, 858 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1988).
37 Kantor, 677 F. Supp. at 1423. Defendants did not contest Lords' minority but
instead argued that given her misrepresentations, they did not know, nor had reason to
believe, that she was underage.
38 Defendants' evidence included: (1) photographic and testimonial evidence that
Lords appeared physically mature when she made the film and acted with a demeanor
and sophistication and apparent sexual experience that belied her minority; (2) evidence
that Lords and those responsible for her employment produced a false California photo-
graphic identification of her age, as well as release forms and other official documents
that misrepresented her age; and (3) evidence that Lords had appeared in two mass-
marketed magazines that- were known to investigate the age of their models. United
States v. United States Dist. Court, 858 F.2d at 540.
39 Id.
40 Courts in other jurisdictions had previously rejected efforts to inject a mens rea
requirement into the child pornography offense. See United States v. Kleiner, 663 F.
Supp. 43 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
41 United States v. United States Dist. Court, 858 F.2d at 536.




defense,44 the legislators removed the term.45 The conference com-
mittee accepted the House version "with the intent that it is not a
necessary element of a prosecution that the defendant knew the ac-
tual age of the child."'46
Despite acknowledging the strict liability nature of the offense,
both the trial and appellate courts in Kantor hesitated to apply strict
liability to individuals deceived into committing a crime. Making
pornographic films is not illegal.47 Prosecution of the case appeared
to violate both the First Amendment and due process principles. By
permitting prosecution of defendants who reasonably believed their
employee was an adult, the statute could potentially censor a pro-
tected form of artistic expression. 48 The First Amendment protects
the right to film hard core pornographic scenes, even those with
teenagers in their late teens. 49 Strict liability for using underage
subjects might deter producers from making adult films in which the
actors and actresses were of legal age. 50 Given this First Amend-
ment issue, the trial court believed it had to either invalidate the
statute or engraft some type of defense onto the statute to allow
defendants to prove their good faith belief that their employee was
over eighteen years old.5'
Apart from the First Amendment concern, the trial court be-
lieved "allow[ing] an employer to be imprisoned and severely [sic]
fined based upon a factual error, which might have been the product
of trickery and deception" was fundamentally unfair.52 According
to the trial court, due process requires that if lengthy incarceration
is to be based on a defendant's factual error, "the error cannot be
one into which the person had been intentionally and convincingly
tricked."53
44 S. REP. No. 438, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
40, 64; H.R. REP. No. 696, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 21-22 (1977).
45 See H.R. REP. No. 696, at 12.
46 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 811, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 69, 69; S. CONF. REP. No. 601, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977).
47 See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) ("The First
Amendment will not tolerate the total suppression of erotic materials that have some
arguably artistic value.").
48 United States v. United States Dist. Court, 858 F.2d 534, 538 (9th Cir. 1988),
aff'g United States v. Kantor, 677 F. Supp. 1421 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
49 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1982).
50 As the Supreme Court noted in Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959), legal
doctrines such as strict liability, although generally constitutional, "cannot be applied in
settings where they have the collateral effect of inhibiting the freedom of expression, by
making the individual the more reluctant to exercise it." Id at 151.
51 Kantor, 677 F. Supp. at 1432-33.
52 Id at 1435.
53 Id.
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In addressing these concerns, the trial court sought an alterna-
tive that would balance the legislature's interest in aggressive prose-
cution of child pornography cases with the defendants' First
Amendment and due process interests in having a factfinder ad-
judge their culpability. The court relied on a good faith defense.
Under this judicially created defense, the court held that the defend-
ants, not the prosecution, would bear the burden of proving lack of
knowledge by the defendants. 54 The prosecution need only prove
that defendants made the pornographic films, and that some aspect
of producing or distributing those films affected interstate com-
merce.55 No proof that defendants knew or suspected Lords' young
age would be required.
After the prosecution proved its case, the defendants could
prove "the defense of a good faith, reasonable mistake of fact as to
Lords' actual age."5 6 The defendants would be required to carry
the burden of proving this mistake to the jury. By allowing this de-
fense, the court could give effect to clear congressional intent to cre-
ate a crime in which the defendants' knowledge of Lords' age would
not be an element of the offense. The court would nonetheless al-
low the defendants to introduce evidence of their mental states as a
defense to the crime.
On appeal, the government challenged this perceived disregard
for legislative will. The statute did not "allow a minor's guile to
create a 'reasonable mistake' excuse; pornographers must take
whatever steps are necessary to establish the age of the subjects they
depict-or they must employ different subjects." 57 The prosecution
argued that implicit within the nature of a strict liability offense was
that no evidence regarding the defendants' intent could be offered
at trial.58 The prosecution also argued that the state's interest in
protecting children against pornography outweighed the defend-
ants' First Amendment rights and that the legislature alone should
balance these interests. 59 If the legislature wanted to create a strict
54 Id.
55 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (1988).
56 Kantor, 677 F. Supp. at 1435.
57 United States v. United States Dist. Court, 858 F.2d 534, 544 (9th Cir. 1988)
(Beezer, J., dissenting), aff'g United States v. Kantor, 677 F. Supp. 1421 (C.D. Cal.
1987).
58 Id. at 536.
59 Judge Beezer agreed with the government. He wrote:
Section 2251 (a), which serves a government interest of the utmost impor-
tance, does not pose a substantial threat of inhibiting protected expres-
sion. The statute as written is constitutional; the first amendment does
not call for a reasonable mistake defense. As a practical matter, such a
defense offers little benefit at great cost.
Id. at 547 (Beezer, J., dissenting).
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liability offense, the court had no authority to fashion a mens rea
defense. 60
Somewhat surprisingly,61 the Ninth Circuit rejected the govern-
ment's argument and upheld the good faith defense.62 Writing for
the majority, Judge Alex Kozinski found a good faith defense com-
patible with the concept of a strict liability crime. The court viewed
the good faith defense as a proper means of balancing the govern-
ment's interest in using a strict liability standard against the defend-
ants' interest in being punished only for culpable acts. 63 The court
believed it had both the right and the responsibility to balance these
conflicting interests6 particularly when "specific constitutional
guarantees" were threatened. 65 According to the Ninth Circuit,
Congress' interest in protecting minors from exploitative use in por-
nographic films only relieved the prosecution from proving intent.66
It did not preclude a defense based upon the defendants' good faith
mistake as to Lords' age.
In order to prove their lack of culpability, the court required
defendants to show by clear and convincing evidence that they were
mistaken as to Lords' age, and that they had been misled in their
60 According to the dissent, Congress could create a crime forcing defendants to
act at their own peril because the need for strict liability outweighed the defendants'
countervailing interests in producing films: "Congress intended to protect children like
Traci Lords, who try to pass as adults to appear in pornography.... Section 2251(a) is
the strongest protection for such children. It puts the burden on producers of pornog-
raphy to establish that their subjects are not minors." Id. at 544 (Beezer, J., dissenting).
61 This result was a surprising display of judicial activism. Rather than adhering
strictly to the text of the statute, the court permitted a-defense not provided by Con-
gress. Id at 542.
62 Id
63 The court's language reveals the tensions it faced. Although the case involved a
First Amendment issue, the opinion also discloses an underlying concern for "fairness,"
The Court of Appeals stated that the good faith defense was "grounded in common law
notions of public policy." Id. at 543. The district court stated more explicitly:
When a factual error made by one who knowingly engages in a regulated
activity which could have been abolished, and by mistake of fact seriously
injures a strong interest of the "innocent public," it does not seem partic-
ularly unfair to punish the person even where the penalty is large. There
is a sense of injustice, however, when a person is punished where the
"innocent public" is not innocent, but is instead another individual who,
by his own connivance, has produced the error, but for which, no crime
would have been committed.
United States v. Kantor, 677 F. Supp. 1421, 1435 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (emphasis added),
aff'd sub noam., United States v. United States Dist. Court, 858 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1988).
64 United States v. United States Dist. Court, 858 F.2d at 542-43.
65 Id. Although the primary constitutional issue was the First Amendment chal-
lenge to the statute, a due process basis for the decision appeared as well. Analogizing
the case to one in which due process required the court to consider an outrageous gov-
ernment conduct defense, the court held that it had the power to engraft a narrow mis-
take of age defense in order to avoid constitutional infirmity. Id. at 542.
66 Defendants argued that the government must prove scienter as part of its case.
The court expressly rejected this suggestion. Id at 543 n.6.
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efforts to ascertain the truth. 67 The good faith defense would,
therefore, continue to require that those in the industry use the
highest level of caution in selecting actors. The law would presume
that the hiring of an underage actress was not accidental. Nonethe-
less, if the defendants could make an affirmative showing of their
efforts to comply with the law, they would avoid conviction.68 As
might be expected, once the court recognized the good faith de-




The Kantor case is a microcosm of the strict liability debate.
70
Congress may be tempted to pass strict liability statutes to provide
maximum protection from certain conduct. If the prosecution need
not prove the defendant's intent, its burden becomes considerably
lighter.7 1 Thus, strict liability presents an attractive alternative for
combatting conduct such as child pornography.
On the other hand, Kantor shows how the strict liability doc-
trine, if left unchecked, can violate one of the most basic principles
of criminal law: that criminal liability is warranted only when a de-
fendant is proven culpable. It is easy to presume that pornography
producers know that minors audition for their films, especially now
that many youth tragically try to pass themselves off as adults to gain
the "wealth" and "glamour" of a film career. However, given the
primacy of culpability in criminal law, each criminal case must be
67 Id. at 543 n.5.
68 Id. The court acknowledged that it intended to create a very narrow defense:
Such a defense would be entirely implausible under most circumstances,
particularly in cases involving children or prepubescent teenagers. Even
when dealing with older teenagers, a defendant would have a tough row
to hoe in convincing a jury that he had acted with appropriate prudence
in ensuring that the actor or actress was an adult. Cases like this one,
where the actress allegedly engaged in a deliberate and successful effort
to deceive the entire industry, are likely to be exceedingly rare; even in
those rare instances, juries may well be skeptical and choose to convict.
Id. at 542-43.
69 Telephone interview with Ronni McClaren, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Central Dis-
trict of California (Jan. 30, 1991), cited in J6rn Axel Holl, Note, Judges, Congress and the
Sixteen-Year-Old Porn Star: Questions on the Proper Role of the First Amendment, 75 IowA L.
REV. 1355, 1365 n.90 (1990).
70 Three student notes have addressed the Kantor case. Their focus, however, has
been limited to the decision's First Amendment implications. See Holl, supra note 69;
Janelle E. Pretzer, Note, United States v. United States Dist. Court (Kantor): Protecting
Children From Sexual Exploitation or Protecting the Pornography Producer?, 20 PAc. LJ. 1343
(1989); Robert R. Strang, Note, "She Was Just Seventeen... And The Way She Looked Was
Way Beyond [Her Years]" Child Pornography and Overbreadth, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1779
(1990).
71 Kelman, supra note 7, at 1515 (arguing that "proof of state of minds is adminis-
tratively burdensome").
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judged on its own merits. In some cases, the defendant is not the
villain and the child is not the victim. Kantor was one such case.
Society has not chosen to ban all pornography; in fact, the First
Amendment protects its production. Strict liability punishes indi-
viduals (such as the defendants in Kantor) who have engaged in con-
stitutionally protected activity, endeavored to comply with the law,
and acted as anyone else would under the circumstances. Those
who attempt to comply with the law and produce constitutionally
protected material should not be convicted on par with those who
intentionally exploit children.
Over the course of time, the strict liability doctrine has been
used to prosecute individuals who are not clearly culpable. Exam-
ples of convictions include: a widow convicted for adultery who re-
married after being told her husband was dead when, unbeknownst
to her, he was still alive;72 a farmer convicted for trespass who er-
ected a fence on another's land after being given a faulty survey re-
port by government officials; 73 and a food retailer convicted for
selling adulterated products when he had no involvement in the
sale.74 Society ordinarily would not want to punish these individuals
because they acted as reasonable persons would have under similar
circumstances. For such individuals, the good faith defense can
reshape strict liability crimes into offenses that consider individual
culpability.
As the financial and environmental hazards affecting public wel-
fare increase, the strict liability doctrine will be invoked more fre-
quently by legislatures and prosecutors. At the same time, the strict
liability doctrine is more likely to be misapplied to offenses that
should require proof of intent.75 Recent evidence bears out this
trend.76 For example, President George Bush launched his own
72 Regina v. Tolson, 23 Q.B.D. 168 (1889); see also Commonwealth v. Mash, 48
Mass. (7 Met.) 472 (1844) (bigamy conviction proper even when defendant reasonably
but mistakenly believes his first wife to be dead).
73 State v. Gould, 40 Iowa 372 (1875).
74 Groff v. State, 171 Ind. 547 (1909) (defendant did not sell product and had left
express instructions to his employee not to sell it).
75 In discussing public welfare offenses, Dean Sayre warned of this danger.
The modem rapid growth of a large body of offenses punishable without
proof of a guilty intent is marked with real danger. Courts are familiar-
ized with the pathway to easy convictions by relaxing the orthodox re-
quirement of a mens rea. The danger is that in the case of true crimes
where the penalty is severe and the need for ordinary criminal law safe-
guards is strong, courts following the false analogy of the public welfare
offenses may now and again similarly relax the mens rea requirement, par-
ticularly in the case of unpopular crimes, as the easiest way to secure de-
sired convictions.
Sayre, supra note 1, at 79.
76 In the last five years, at least seven federal statutes have been codified or recodi-
fled to impose strict liability for offenses carrying possible punishment of incarceration.
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"war" against those perceived as responsible for the massive fail-
ures of financial institutions. Not surprisingly, early savings and
loan fraud cases included attempts to use strict liability charges. In
the recent prosecution of Charles Keating, the former president of
See, e.g., Tobacco Adjustment Act of 1984, 7 U.S.C. § 509 (Supp. 111990) (imprisonment
up to five years for failure to comply with tobacco manufacturer's reporting require-
ments); Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 50 (1988) (imprisonment up to one
year for failure to answer commission inquiry); Wholesale Meat Act, 21 U.S.C. § 676
(1988) (imprisonment up to one year for distribution or attempted distribution of
adulterated article); Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 333
(1988) (imprisonment up to one year for distribution of adulterated or mislabeled food
or drugs); Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 938 (1988)
(imprisonment up to one year for employer's failure to secure payment of workers' com-
pensation to employee); Antitrust Amendments Act of 1990 (amending Sherman Act),
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (Supp. 11 1990) (imprisonment up to three years for contract, trust, or
conspiracy in restraint of trade).
The prosecution and conviction rate for regulatory crimes, many of which are pros-
ecuted under strict liability principles, is also increasing. As the charts below indicate,
defendants prosecuted under federal public-order offenses increased by 33% from 1980
to 1988, the number of convictions under these statutes increased by 27%, and the
percentage of defendants convicted of these crimes who were sentenced to prison in-
creased from 31.0% to 40.6%. The average sentence length for conviction also rose
from approximately two years to two years, three months.
Table 5.10: Defendants Prosecuted in U.S. District Courts
1980 1985 1986 1987 1988
Number 7o Number 7 Number 7o Number 7 Number 7
Public-order offenses 12,696 38.9 16,837 49.7 16,764 46A 16,673 49.6 16,921 47.3
Regulatory offenses 1,936 31.1 2,548 39.2 2,520 35.8 2,867 38.3 3,064 39.2
Agriculture 75 24.8 241 57.7 183 44.5 340 68A 418 68.0
Antitrust 154 84.6 55 77.5 65 89.0 114 79.2 100 82.0
Fair labor standards 16 39.0 27 47.4 26 63A 19 46.3 19 47.5
Food and drug 233 49.4 237 63.7 402 72.6 475 75.4 494 79.2
Motor carrier 61 53.5 85 59.9 76 57.1 75 52.1 86 45.3
Other regulatory offenses 1,397 27.4 1,903 34.9 1,768 30.3 1,844 30.6 1,947 31.2
Table 5.11: Defendants Convicted in U.S. District Courts
1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Public-order offenses 11,893 15,132 15,193 14,500 14,593 15,120
Regulatory offenses 1,828 2,167 2,010 1,847 1,965 2,010
Agriculture 308 369 174 167 261 244
Antitrust 125 118 74 110 178 110
Fair labor standards 30 38 42 60 34 29
Food and drug 105 86 85 72 50 120
Motor carrier 73 104 82 52 66 59
Other regulatory offenses 1,187 1,452 1,553 1,386 1,376 1,448
Table 5.12: Offenders Sentenced to Prison in U.S. District Courts
Preliminary
1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Number % Number % Number % Number 7o Number 6 Number 7a
3,690 31.0 5.410 35.8 5,682 37.4 5,312 36.6 5,395 37.0 6,145 40.6
484 26.5 661 30.5 688 34.2 601 32.5 640 32.6 742 36.9
54 17.5 51 13.8 24 13.8 16 9.6 52 19.9 37 15.2
32 25.6 6 5.1 7 9.5 11 10.0 43 24.2 22 20.0
11 36.7 4 10.5 2 4.8 3 5.0 6 17.6 2 6.9
5 4.8 10 11.6 13 15.3 19 26A 8 16.0 24 20.0
2 2.7 34 32.7 18 22.0 15 28.8 27 40.9 21 35.6
380 32.0 556 38.3 624 40.2 537 38.7 504 36.6 636 43.9
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Lincoln Savings and Loan Association, 77 the prosecution asserted
that the charge of aiding and abetting the sale of securities through
misstatements of material fact 78 did not require a showing of knowl-
edge or intent, and Keating could be found guilty regardless of his
awareness of any misstatements. 79 According to the prosecution,
Keating could be responsible for the criminal acts of his subordi-
nates by virtue of his supervisory position.80 Arguing that his
knowledge of any misstatements was irrelevant, the prosecution
asked the court to bar all evidence that Keating had instructed his
staff not to use misrepresentations. 8 ' According to the prosecution,
if any member of Keating's staff made the misrepresentations, his or
her guilt should be imputed to Keating.8 2 The prosecution pro-
posed to hold Keating "responsible for an offense which, no matter
how careful, no matter how honest, no matter how decent and law
abiding he may be, [he] could not by the most diligent effort know
about."8 3
Table 5.13: Average Length of Prison Sentences for Offenders Convicted in U.S. District Courts
Average sentence length for convicted offenders
sentenced to prison (in months)
Preliminary
1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Public-order offenses 24.5 32.7 36.9 35.5 30.7 27.0
Regulatory offenses 25.3 37.7 47.2 42.1 30A 22.8
Agriculture 12A 16.3 6.2 11.7 7.4 7.9
Antitrust 3.2 5.3 10.7 3.6 8.3 13.5
Fair labor standards 53.0 10.2 36.0 2.0 8.7 5.0
Food and drug 4A 9.5 24.9 17.1 12.6 11.3
Motor carrier 66.5 10.2 6.9 10.2 23.6 11.8
Other regulatory offenses 28.3 42.4 50.9 45.8 35.6 24.8
BUREAu oFJusTIcE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTCE, pub. no. NCJ-125616, FED. CRIM. CASE PROCESSING,
1980-87, ADDENDtUM FOR 1988 AND PREIMINARY 1989, at 2, 3, 9, 15, 16, 17, reprinted in SouRcEs oF CRIM.
Jusr. STATS., table 5.10-5.13 (1990).
77 People v. Keating, No. BA 025236 (Super. Ct. Cal. 1991).
78 CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25540, 25401 (West Supp. 1992).
79 See People's Proposed Liability TheoryJury Instruction, Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support Thereof (filedJuly 17, 1991); People's Surrebutter in Oppo-
sition to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Pursuant to Penal Code Section 995 (filedJune
7, 1991); Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss
Pursuant to Penal Code Section 995 (filed June 7, 1991), People v. Keating, No. BA
025236 (Super. Ct. Cal. 1991).
80 Id
81 Id. In support of its position, the prosecution relied on a series of strict liability
cases, including the frequently cited case of State v. Lindberg, 215 P. 41 (Wash. 1923).
In Lindberg, the statute in question provided that "every director and officer of any bank
... who shall borrow ... any of its funds in an excessive amount.., shall.., be guilty of
a felony." WASH. ComP. STAT. § 3259 (Remington 1922). The court rejected the prof-
fered defense that defendant had borrowed the money in question only after he had
been assured by another bank official that the money had come from a bank other than
his own. The Lindberg court held that evidence of defendant's mistake was inadmissible
at trial.
82 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants' Motions to
Dismiss Pursuant to Penal Code Section 995, at 35 (filedJune 7, 1991), People v. Keat-
ing, No. BA 025236 (Super. Ct. Cal. 1991).
83 Respondent's Brief, at 18-20, Keating, Case No. BA 025236.
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The Keating court correctly rejected the prosecution's argu-
ment. While the language of the statute and its legislative history
suggested that the legislature wanted to impose maximum responsi-
bility on corporate officials for the acts of their employees,8 4 the
concept of culpability did not appear to have been abandoned alto-
gether. The court held that the statute did not create a strict liability
crime, thereby requiring the prosecution to prove Keating's fraudu-
lent intent.
Rather than reinterpreting the statute, the Keating court could
have applied the good faith defense. By so doing, the court would
recognize the need for expeditious prosecution of savings and loan
fraud without punishing an individual who could prove he was not
knowingly responsible for a criminal act. Using the good faith de-
fense, the legislative presumption that defendants like Keating are
responsible for their subordinates' criminal acts could be rebutted
by the defendant proving an absence of culpable intent.
In both Kantor and Keating, the legislature recognized a need to
ease the prosecution's burden in certain cases. The strict liability
doctrine is the standard mechanism for satisfying this need. Yet,
these cases demonstrate that courts remain uncomfortable with the
doctrine, especially when the defendant faces possible imprison-
ment. In these situations, courts searching for a solution can look to
the good faith defense. In Kantor, the court adopted this approach.
In Keating, the court simply refused to apply the strict liability doc-
trine and required the prosecution to prove intent. This Article will
demonstrate that the Kantor court better accommodated both the
interests of the defendant in being punished for only culpable be-
havior and the interests of the state in using the strict liability
doctrine.8
5
84 Keating was charged under California Corporations Code §§ 25401 and 25110.
Several California courts found these statutes to be strict liability offenses. People v.
Baumgart, 267 Cal. Rptr. 534 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); People v. Johnson, 262 Cal. Rptr.
366 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); People v. Clem, 114 Cal. Rptr. 359 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974). In
Baumgart, the court referred to the important underlying social policies considered by
the legislature in enacting the strict liability provision:
In the interest of the public the burden is placed upon the actor of ascer-
taining at his peril whether his deed is within the prohibition of any crimi-
nal statute. . . . As the cases emphasize, the main objective of the
securities law is to protect the public against the imposition of insubstan-
tial, unlawful and fraudulent stock and investment schemes and to pro-
mote full disclosure of all information that is necessary to make informed
and intelligent investment decisions.
Baumgart, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 541 (citations omitted).
85 A third approach is available and was used recently by the Ninth Circuit in
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 1992 WL 367097 (9th Cir. Dec. 16, 1992). In
X-Citement, the court was confronted with a challenge to the constitutionality of 18
U.S.C. § 2252 (1988). Section 2252 prohibits the distribution, receipt, and shipping of
child pornography. The defendant, a distributor of pornographic tapes, was charged
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This Article next discusses the nature of strict liability crimes
and the interests they are designed to serve. By understanding the
interests furthered by the strict liability doctrine, as well as those it
ignores, it is possible to construct a good faith defense that serves
the interests of all involved.
II
THE NATURE OF STRICT LIABILITY CRIMES
A. Defining Strict Liability Crimes
While the precise meaning of "strict liability offenses" is un-
clear,86 they are viewed most often as crimes for which liability is
imposed irrespective of the defendant's knowledge or intentions,
that is, crimes without a mens rea requirement.87 Consequently, the
strict liability doctrine traditionally rejects even a reasonable mis-
take of a fact or circumstance material to a finding of guilt.88 As one
with distributing Videotapes featuiing Traci Lords. Lords was under the age of 18 at the
time the films were made. Judge Kozinski, in his dissent, encouraged the panel to en-
graft a mens rea requirement of recklessness onto the statute. Instead, the majority
struck down the statute as unconstitutional on its face for violating the First Amend-
ment.
As discussed infra in part III.B, this alternative of declaring a statute unconstitu-
tional is rarely used by the courts, especially in cases not involving First Amendment
issues. One reason this option is rejected is that it does not take into account any of the
legislative interests in employing the strict liability doctrine. 1992 WL 367097, at *10
(Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("the policies Congress sought to advance by enacting
[§ 2252(a)] can be effectuated even" after we read a mental state element of recklessness
into the statute) (citation omitted).
86 These offenses are often called "absolute liability" or "vicarious liability" of-
fenses. As discussed infra, these terms may not always be interchangeable. While "strict
liability" and "absolute liability" are often used interchangeably to describe an offense
with no mens rea requirement, see, e.g., C.B. Cato, Strict Liability and the Half-Way House,
1981 N.Z. L.J. 294, 294 n.6, "absolute liability" is more precisely used to describe those
situations in commonwealth countries in which the Parliament has expressly stated that
not only is there no mens rea requirement but also that there can be no defense based
upon mens rea (e.g., the good faith defense) as well. Id. Vicarious liability refers to a
respondeat superior notion that a supervising individual or corporation may be crimi-
nally liable for another's act without knowledge of the wrongful conduct of the responsi-
ble party. See Alan 0. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the
Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563 (1988) (defin-
ing vicarious liability as "the imposition of liability upon one party for a wrong commit-
ted by another party"); see also Western Fuels-Utah Inc. v. Federal Mine Safety & Health
Review Comm'n, 870 F.2d 711, 713 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (discussing the difference between
strict liability and vicarious liability). Some crimes may, in fact, implicate both doctrines.
See, e.g., United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975), discussed infra note 295.
87 mhe Legislature has thought it so important to prevent the particular act
from being committed that it absolutely forbids it to be done; and if it is
done the offender is liable to penalty whether he has any mens rea or not,
and whether or not he intended to commit a breach of the law.
Jackson, supra note 1, at 83.
88 PACKER, LiMrrs, supra note 1, at 123 ("For our purpose strict liability can be de-
fined as the refusal to pay attention to a claim of mistake."); FLETCHER, supra note 15, at
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commentator has noted, "the premise of strict liability is that the
defendant is held guilty no matter how careful and morally innocent
he or she ... has been."9
8 9
We have seen that the law may prohibit the use of minors in
pornographic films.90 Therefore, under a traditional strict liability
approach, a defendant who conscientiously tries to ascertain an ac-
tress' age but is misled in his attempts would nonetheless be guilty if
the actress is a minor.91 Practically speaking, defendants face an ir-
rebuttable presumption that they knew the actress' age.
Because of its uncompromising approach, the strict liability
doctrine has been reserved historically for two categories of crimes:
(1) public welfare offenses and (2) morality offenses.9 2 In studying
each of these categories, we can better view the rationales proffered
for the doctrine.
716 ("[w]e define strict liability to mean liability imposed ... without considering...
whether the defendant may exculpate himself by proving a mistake ... .
89 Singer, supra note 1, at 356.
90 Because there are other aspects of this offense, such as making the films, that
may require a showing of mens rea, some may argue that child pornography is not a
strict liability offense. See Percy H. Winfield, The Myth ofAbsolute Liability, 42 LAW Q. REV.
37, 46 (1926). This perspective, however, is too narrow. In reality, strict liability is a
term used to describe a wide variety of offenses.
The strictest view of strict liability offenses is one in which the statute does not
impose any culpable mental state, even one of negligence, for any of the defendant's
actions. For example, if a defendant is charged with possessing an explosive device he
can be convicted, even if completely unaware that he had anything in his possession.
Such use of the doctrine is rare, if it indeed does exist. See PACKER, LIMITS, supra note 1
(arguing that mens rea always applies to some element of the offense).
Rather, the strict liability crime is generally one for which knowledge of the key or
"material" elements of the offense is not required. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(4),
2.05, (Am. Law Inst. 1962); see also STANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER,
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 217 (5th ed. 1989) ("In this special sense, mens rea
refers only to the mental state required by the definition of the offense to accompany the
act that produces or threatens the harm."); Francis Bennion, Statutowy Exceptions: A Third
Knot in the Golden Thread?, 1988 CRIM. L. REv. 31, 34-35 (explaining how a strict liability
offense may require knowledge as to one element of the offense and not as to another
element); Saltzman, supra note 1, at 1575 (giving examples of strict liability offenses in
which knowledge as to one element is irrelevant); Kenneth M. Simmons, Rethinking
Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463, 554 (1992) (arguing that "strict liability" is something
of a misnomer because the law typically requires a distinct mental state as to some, if not
all, elements of the offense). Therefore, while the defendant may need to be aware that
he has some article in his possession, it would be irrelevant whether he thought it was a
harmless alarm clock or a powerful bomb. See United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601
(1971). Or, for the Kantor case, whereas the defendants may have needed to know they
were producing pornographic films (a protected activity), they did not need to know that
their star was underage (the circumstance that threatens the harm). This approach to
defining strict liability crimes is not only more practical, but focuses on the essence of
criminal law: punishing defendants who either know, or should know, that they are not
in conformity with society's norms. SeeJohnson, supra note 1, at 1520.
91 United States v. United States Dist. Court, 858 F.2d 534, 538 (9th Cir. 1988),
aff'g United States v. Kantor, 677 F. Supp. 1421 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
92 Saltzman, supra note 1, at 1573.
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B. Justifications for Strict Liability Crimes
1. Public Welfare Offenses
The strict liability doctrine often applies to so-called "public
welfare" offenses or regulatory crimes promulgated to address the
dangers brought about by the advent of the industrial revolution.
93
Public welfare offenses include the sale of impure or adulterated
foods or drugs, driving faster than the speed limit, the sale of intoxi-
cating liquor to minors, and improper handling of dangerous chem-
icals or nuclear wastes. 94 Defendants violate these laws regardless
of their intent or absence of negligent conduct.
There are several reasons the strict liability doctrine is used to
redress invasions of the public welfare. First, the doctrine is em-
ployed for these offenses because it shifts the risks of dangerous ac-
tivity to those best able to prevent a mishap.95 For example, a
pharmaceutical manufacturer is in a unique position to know and
control product quality. Strict liability holds the manufacturer liable
if that product becomes contaminated for any reason. The risk of
93 Sayre, supra note 1, at 68-69. In Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246
(1952), the Supreme Court chronicled the history and rationale of strict liability
offenses:
The industrial revolution multiplied the number of workmen exposed to
injury from increasingly powerful... mechanisms .... Traffic... came
to subject the wayfarer to intolerable casualty risks if owners and drivers
were not to observe new cares and uniformities of conduct. Congestion
of cities . . . called for health and welfare regulations undreamed of in
simpler times. Wide distribution of goods became an instrument of wide
distribution of harm.... Such dangers have engendered .. . detailed
regulations which heighten the duties of those in control of particular
industries, trades, properties, or activities that affect public health, safety
or welfare....
While such offenses do not threaten the security of the state in the
manner of treason, they may be regarded as offenses against its authority,
for their occurrence impairs the efficiency of controls deemed essential to
the social order as presently constituted. In this respect, whatever the
intent of the violator, the injury is the same.... Hence, legislation appli-
cable to such offenses.., does not specify intent as a necessary element.
Id. at 253-54.
94 Sayre, supra note 1, at 55; see, e.g., United States v. International Minerals &
Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971) (transportation of dangerous liquids or products);
United States v.Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984) (dumping of haz-
ardous wastes); United States v. Catlett, 747 F.2d 1102 (6th Cir. 1984) (killing of pro-
tected animals under Migratory Bird Treaty Act); United States v. Y. Hata & Co., 535
F.2d 508 (9th Cir.) (prosecution under Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 828 (1976); People v. Dillard, 201 Cal. Rptr. 136 (Cal. App. 1984) (carrying loaded
firearm).
95 Genevra Richardson, Strict Liability for Regulatory Crime: The Empirical Research,
1987 CraM. L. REv. 295, 296; see also OLIVER W. HOLMEs, THE COMMON LAW 57-59
(1881). In Dean Roscoe Pound's words, "[Strict liability] statutes are not meant to pun-
ish the vicious will but to put pressure upon the thoughtless and inefficient to do their
whole duty in the interest of public health or safety or morals." RoscoE POUND, THE
SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 52 (1921).
420 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:401
mishap is shifted to the manufacturer who can be assured of avoid-
ing liability only by not engaging in the particular high risk
activity.9
6
Yet, this reason alone cannot justify the doctrine. The strict lia-
bility doctrine is not the only possible method for shifting risk onto
the manufacturer. A criminal negligence standard also shifts the
risk to the party engaging in the activity and punishes those who act
carelessly. 97 Under a negligence standard, a defendant is liable for
failure to act as a reasonable person would have under the circum-
stances, even if he did not intend or appreciate the risks of his activi-
ties. 98 Under a negligence standard, if the defendant acts
reasonably and harm results, no punishment follows. Nonetheless,
the burden to learn and operate within society's standards rests with
the defendant.
The strict liability doctrine operates in a fundamentally differ-
ent way.99 While both negligence and strict liability shift the burden
of risk avoidance to the defendant, only under strict liability are in-
dividuals imprisoned even if they take all possible precautions to act
reasonably. 00 The sole question for the trier of fact is whether the
defendant committed the proscribed act.' 0 ' The jury may not de-
cide whether the defendant could have done anything else to pre-
vent the unlawful act. 102
96 Wasserstrom, supra note 1, at 737.
97 Mens rea under the negligence standard is of an omissive nature. The negligent
defendant, by definition, is unaware of the risks created by his activities, although he
should be aware of these risks. "It is precisely the attitude of self-centered thoughtless-
ness and disregard for the rights of others despite the capacity and opportunity to realize and
respect these rights which constitutes this form of mens rea." Mueller, supra note 3, at
1063.
98 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d). Although often discussed as a level of mens
rea, see Mueller, supra note 3, at 1063-64, negligence is actually not a state of mind.
Rather, it is a standard of conduct the defendant is expected to maintain regardless of
his state of mind. PACKER, THE LiMrrs, supra note 1, at 143.
99 See Kelman, supra noie 7, at 1513.
100 "Indeed, the premise of strict liability is that the defendant is held guilty no mat-
ter how careful and morally innocent he or she, or one for whose acts he or she is re-
sponsible, has been." Singer, supra note 1, at 356.
101 See Jackson, supra note 1, at 88; Wasserstrom, supra note 1, at 733.
102 See Saltzman, supra note 1, at 1584. In discussing the difference between strict
liability and negligence, Saltzman explains: ,
The difference . . . is that, as long as the crime is a non-strict liability
crime [i.e., negligence], the issue is decided by a tribunal which both
hears the evidence and sets the standard in the defendant's case. Making
the defendant's culpability an issue makes evidence respecting his culpa-
bility admissible and, since the trier of fact knows its decision determines
criminal liability, the trier of fact virtually decides the following question:
under the circumstances, does [the] defendant deserve criminal
punishment?
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Thus, there must be additional reasons for selecting the strict
liability doctrine over the negligence standard. Among these rea-
sons is the need by the legislature to assure that juries will treat like
cases alike when judging conduct involving public welfare. Juries
may be ill-suited to decide what is reasonable in complex high risk
activities. For example, in order for juries to decide what is reason-
able conduct when dealing with nuclear waste, they would have to
be educated on the nuclear industry, the risks posed by it, and the
safeguards that might be taken. Legislatures prefer to make this as-
sessment themselves, rather than relying on the competence ofju-
ries. Moreover, jurors may be swayed by sympathies or prejudices
of a particular case. By dictating what is per se unreasonable, an indi-
vidual jury cannot reassess the standard of reasonableness. 10 3 Ac-
cordingly, a second reason for using the strict liability doctrine is
that it assures uniform treatment of particular, high risk conduct.,0 4
A third justification often offered for the strict liability doctrine
is that it eases the burden on the prosecution to prove intent in diffi-
cult cases.' 0 5 Strict liability is based largely on the assumption that
an accident occurs because the defendant did not take care to pre-
vent it.106 No showing of intent or negligence is required, because
the fact that a prohibited act occurred demonstrates the defendant's
negligence. As with most irrebuttable presumptions, the legislature
believes individual inquiries are unnecessary because the over-
whelming majority of cases will show that the defendant acted at
least negligently. 10 7 Seen in this light, strict liability is a procedural
shortcut to punish those who would be culpable under traditional
theories of criminal law.
103 Id..
104 Kelman, supra note 7, at 1517 (juries operating under vague negligence standard
may encourage "inconsistent, unpredictable, and biased" verdicts). Furthermore, under
a negligence regime a low standard of care in the community could be viewed as reason-
able and acceptable within that community. Id
105 In recognizing the need for strict liability for certain criminal acts, the California
Supreme Court wrote:
"There are many acts that are so destructive of the social order, or where
the ability of the state to establish the element of criminal intent would be
so extremely difficult if not impossible of proof, that in the interest of
justice the legislature has provided that the doing of the act constitutes a
crime, regardless of knowledge or criminal intent on the part of the de-
fendant. In these cases it is the duty of the defendant to know what the
facts are ......
Ex parte Marley, 175 P.2d 832, 835 (Cal. 1946) (quoting State v. Weisberg, 55 N.E.2d
870, 872 (Ohio Ct. App. 1943)).
106 The rationale underlying strict liability is a theory of presumed culpability. See
FLETCHER, supra note 15, at 719.
107 Harold A. Ashford & D. Michael Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Pro-
cess in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE LJ. 165, 173-74 (1969).
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Fourth, even if the presumption is incorrect in a particular case,
legislatures determine that this risk is outweighed by the need for
additional protection of society and expeditious prosecution of cer-
tain cases.' 08 For example, driving in excess of a posted speed limit
is typically a strict liability crime.' 0 9 With nearly 398,000 annual
traffic cases in one state alone," 0 processing these cases as quickly
as possible is important. The most efficient way to process such
cases is to presume defendants drive carelessly when exceeding
speed limits. The presumption is generally accurate and, even when
it is not, the need for public safety and the relatively minor punish-
ment' minimizes any concern about injustice. 12
Finally, the strict liability doctrine is attractive as a powerful
public statement of legislative intolerance for certain behavior. By
labeling an offense as strict liability, the legislature can claim to pro-
vide the utmost protection from certain public harms. By affording
no leniency for defendants causing harm, the legislature affirms so-
ciety's interest in being protected from certain conduct. In this
sense, strict liability expresses emphatically that such conduct will
not be tolerated regardless of the actor's intent.
2. Morality Offenses
Similar justifications have been offered for the application of
the strict liability doctrine to "morality crimes," offenses involving
108 The rationale of the doctrine of strict liability is that, although criminal
sanctions are relied upon, the primary purpose of the statutes is regula-
tion rather than punishment or correction, and that the interest of the
enforcement for the public health and safety requires the risk that an occa-
sional non-offender may be punished in order to prevent the escape of a greater
number of culpable offenders.
People v. Travers, 124 Cal. Rptr. 728, 730 (1975) (citing People v. Stuart, 302 P.2d 5, 8-
9 (1956)) (emphasis added). Thus, in the interest of efficiency, the criminal law accepts
some risk that the defendant charged with a strict liability crime did not act negligently.
Ashford, supra note 107, at 182-84. At some point, however, this risk becomes too high
and the presumption may be viewed as unconstitutional. Although at no set point does
the risk of convicting an innocent person outweigh the interests in efficiency, some au-
thors have suggested that the standard of precision must certainly be greater than 90%
and should approach 99% in order to be consistent with notions of due process. Id. at
183.
109 See, e.g., McCallum v. State, 567 A.2d 967 (Md. App. 1990).
110 There were 397,935 nonparking traffic violations in California during 1990. See
JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, STATE OF CALIFORNIA ANNUAL DATA REFERENCE 137,
tbl. 1 (1991).
111 The assumption in public welfare offenses appears to be that the defendant will
receive little or no time in jail and a monetary sanction. Sayre, supra note 1, at 78.
112 Professor Sayre explained that "the penalty in such cases is so slight that the
courts can afford to disregard the individual in protecting the social interest." Id at 70.
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transgressions of society's sexual and social norms.113 Examples of
these crimes are statutory rape, adultery, and bigamy. 1 4
Consider the classic case of Regina v. Prince." 5 In Prince, the
defendant was convicted for eloping with a minor without her fa-
ther's permission. 1 6 Although the jury accepted the defendant's
claim that he did not know the girl was underage, the court denied a
defense, finding "[t]he act forbidden is wrong in itself,.., not...
illegal, but wrong."" 17
The court in Prince did not require that defendant know the age
of the girl with whom he eloped. Eloping with any young woman
without her father's permission was considered morally wrong." 8
Because of this, the court felt it appropriate to impose punishment
regardless of defendant's knowledge of the girl's age. The defen-
dant bore the risk that his borderline conduct would violate a provi-
sion of the law.
As with the public welfare offenses, the less comfortable society
is with certain types of behavior, the more likely the legislature will
113 See generally Allen, supra note 7 (addressing "the morality of means" in assorted
contexts). Once again, strict liability is justified under the theory "that the need to pre-
vent certain kinds of occurrences is sufficiently great as to override the undesirable effect
of punishing those who might in some other sense be 'innocent.'" Wasserstrom, supra
note 1, at 739;' see Regina v. Prince, L.R. 2 CR. CAS. REs. 154 (1875) (Eng.); see, e.g.,
United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971) (strict liability used for drug offense). Fur-
thermore, strict liability underlies the felony murder doctrine under which a defendant
engaging in criminal behavior is responsible for any resulting deaths, foreseeable or not.
FrankJ. Remington & Orrin L. Helstad, The Mental Element in Crime-A Legislative Problem,
1952 Wis. L. Rav. 644, 655.
114 Remington & Helstad, supra note 113, at 670; see, e.g., Rex v. Wheat, Rex v.
Stocks, [1921] 2 K.B. 119 (holding that it was no defense to bigamy that defendant
believed he had a divorce); see also Sayre, supra note 1, at 73-75 (analyzing strict liability
crimes of statutory rape and bigamy); Delger Trowbridge, Criminal Intent and Bigamy, 7
CAL. L. RaV. 1 (1918) (proposing good faith defense to strict liability offense of bigamy).
115 L.R. 2 CR. GAS. RES. 154 (1875) (Eng.).
116 The defendant was charged with violation of the Offences Against the Person Act
of 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., c. 100, § 55 (Eng.) providing:
Whosoever shall unlawfully take or cause to be taken any unmarried girl,
being under the age of sixteen years, out of the possession and against
the will of her father or mother, or of any other person having the lawful
care or charge of her, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
117 Prince, L.R. 2 CR. CAS. RES. 154 (1875) (Eng.), 32 L.T.R. 700, 701 (Mar.-Aug.
1875) (Eng.).
118 Lord Bramwell's opinion stated:
[WIrhat the statute contemplates, and what I say is wrong, is the taking of
a female of such tender years that she is properly called a girl, and can be
said to be in another's possession, and in that other's care or charge. No
argument is necessary to prove this; it is enough to state the case. The
Legislature has enacted that if anyone does this wrong act he does it at
the risk of her turning out to be under sixteen.
IL; see also PER B=ar, AN INQUIRY INTO CRImiNAL GUILT 148-49 (1963) (noting that,
at the time of Prince, community ethic morally condemned the taking of any girl without
her guardian's permission).
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turn to the strict liability doctrine to transfer the risks of the behav-
ior to the defendant. These risks include the possibility of physical
or moral harm, and the possibility that a culpable defendant would
escape punishment by feigning ignorance or mistake.' 19
To assure that all juries assess the risks of a particular activity
uniformly, the legislature designates an offense as a strict liability
crime. 120 By not allowing evidence as to why the defendant trans-
gressed, the legislature can avoid the whims of any particular jury.
Rather than having an individual jury decide what conduct is reason-
able, the legislature decides for all strict liability cases. In this man-
ner, firm social and moral lines are clearly drawn. 121
Application of the strict liability doctrine to morality offenses
offers an additional justification for the doctrine. As already dis-
cussed, in strict liability offenses it is presumed that the defendant
took an unjustifiable risk in his conduct and was therefore at least
negligent.' 22 When the defendant's conduct is already morally
questionable-"borderline" conduct-concern for punishing an in-
nocent person decreases. 123 Society does not approve of the defen-
dant's conduct, although the limits of the law may seem to permit it.
If the defendant crosses those limits, intentionally or unintention-
ally, society will seek to punish the defendant's behavior. 124 The
strict liability doctrine thereby serves an important function of set-
ting firm limits on conduct that society is loath to tolerate. The in-
terests in efficient punishment and maximum deterrence of certain
119 "Any increase in the number of conditions required to establish criminal liability
increases the opportunity for deceiving the courts or juries by the pretence that some
condition is not satisfied." Nemerson, supra note 9, at 1537 (quoting H.L.A. HART, PuN-
ISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 77 (1968)).
120 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
121 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
122 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
123 See Peter W. Low, The Model Penal Code, The Common Law, and Mistakes of Fact:
Recklessness, Negligence, or Strict Liability?, 19 RuTGERS LJ. 539, 562 (1988)
(It is not unfair in this situation to hold the actor to an objective standard
of common morality. The behavior-even if the facts were as the defen-
dant believed them to be-is a serious breach of community standards
about which the defendant should know enough to justify the imposition
of serious criminal punishment. Principles of personal autonomy and re-
sponsibility are not offended.).
124 The defendants' conduct in Kantor was an example of such behavior. Society
prohibits child pornography, and even adult pornography is considered borderline be-
havior that will be tolerated only if it remains within strict limits. Thus, the issue raised
in morality offense cases is not whether the defendants' behavior should be lauded, but
whether a defendant who crosses the limits unwittingly, as a reasonable person might
have done when engaging in the same constitutionally protected behavior, should be
criminally punished.
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conduct is seen as outweighing the risk that a nonculpable person
will be punished.1 25
Thus, for both public welfare and morality offenses, relieving
the prosecution of the burden of proving a culpable mens rea is jus-
tified by the presumption that the defendant engaging in marginal
and/or highly risky conduct deserves some punishment. Moreover,
even if that presumption is incorrect in a given case, society receives
valuable protection from such conduct.
C. Opposition to the Strict Liability Doctrine
Opponents of the strict liability doctrine argue that its justifica-
tions are inconsistent with both utilitarian and retributivist theories
of punishment. Under utilitarian theory, punishment is justified if it
deters unlawful behavior. 126 If punishing those who commit prohib-
ited acts will deter others from acting similarly, punishment is justi-
fied. 127 Under the retributivist approach, an individual should be
punished for choosing to violate the law.128 Punishment reflects re-
spect for an individual's autonomy to choose to do "wrong."' 129 If
125 The classic example of this rationale is the felony murder doctrine. See Kevin
Cole, Killings During Crime: Toward a Discriminating Theory of Strict Liability, 28 AMER. CRIM.
L. REV. 73 (1990); Mueller, supra note 3, at 1057; Remington & Helstad, supra note 113,
at 656; Grace E. Mueller, Note, The Mens Rea of Accomplice Liability, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
2169 (1988). The felony murder doctrine imposes strict liability on a felon for any
deaths that occur during his commission of a felony. See Brady, supra note 9, at 218.
The felon is guilty of murder for that death whether or not he anticipated or intended
the death. Cole, supra, at 74, 78 n.15. The willingness to impose felony murder liability
without a showing of intent derives in large part from a presumption that the felon has
already crossed the line into unacceptable behavior and should therefore be liable for
any additional harm he causes. George P. Fletcher, Reflections on Felony-Murder, 12 Sw. U.
L. REv. 413, 427 (1981) (stating that a felon participating in wrongdoing must run risk
the that things will turn out worse than he expects). Once the assumption has been
made that the defendant has a character that should be punished or deterred, there is no
concern under the felony murder doctrine as to whether the defendant had the mental
state for the murder. As with the strict liability doctrine, the defendant's acts classify
him as culpable. Cole, supra, at 77 n.12, 101.
126 JEREMY BENTHAM, Principles of Penal Law, pt. 11, bk. 1, ch. 3, in THE WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM 396,402 (John Bowring ed., 1843); see also Richard Posner, An Economic
Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193 (1985); Louis M. Seidman, Soldiers,
Martyrs, and Criminals: Utilitarian Theory and the Problem of Crime Control, 94 YALE LJ. 315,
319 (1984) (setting forth the principle of deterrence under a utilitarian model).
127 H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968).
128 See Nemerson, supra note 9, at 1560-65.
129 Samuel H. Pillsbury, The Meaning of Deserved Punishment: An Essay on Choice, Char-
acter, and Responsibility, 67 IND. LJ. 719, 722 (1992). Discussing in depth the utilitarian
and retributivist theories of punishment is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally
CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT: VIEWS, EXPLANATIONS AND JUSTIFICATIONS (Rudolph
Gerber & Patrick McAnany eds., 1972); PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT
(Gertrude Ezorsky ed., 1972); THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT (H.B. Actor ed., 1969);
THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT (S. Grupp ed., 1971); A Symposium on Punishment: Critique and
Justification, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 607 (1981). For works on retribution, see David
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an individual chooses to transgress the boundaries established to
protect society, he "deserves" punishment. 130
The strict liability doctrine, especially when applied to defend-
ants misled into committing an unlawful act, is not supported by
either theory of punishment. Under retributivist theory, criminal
law should hold individuals responsible for only those acts for which
they are blameworthy. An individual is blameworthy, not because of
accidental conduct, but because of a conscious and knowing breach
of the law.13' At a minimum, the defendant must have acted below
the standard of care that a reasonable person would have exercised
under the same conditions. A strict liability defendant punished for
an act that he has been misled into committing has not consciously
decided to violate society's norms. Accordingly, under classic re-
tributivist theory, this defendant does not "deserve" to be
punished. 13
2
Additionally, the strict liability doctrine conflicts with utilitarian
theories of punishment. Strict liability laws are inefficient because
they tend to overdeter individuals' behavior.' 33 If the strict liability
defendant can be punished for any conduct crossing a certain pro-
scribed line, the defendant will be inclined to abstain from all activ-
ity that could conceivably result in illegal behavior. In some
situations, certain individuals might abstain from entering a high
risk industry. In situations such as in Kantor, individuals may be de-
terred from engaging in constitutionally protected activity. Thus,
strict liability may deter individuals from engaging in activities that
are socially necessary or desirable, constitutionally protected, or
both. In this manner, strict liability overdeters conduct.
134
Dolinko, Some Thoughts About Retributivism, 101 ETmics 537 (1991); PeterJ. Steinberger,
Hegel on Crime and Punishment, 77 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 858 (1983).
130 IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (W. Hastie trans., 1887).
131 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, Commentaries *21 and *27.
132 It is a fiction to state that an individual who commits a strict liability crime by
accident or by reason of fraud has acted in a morally culpable manner. Moral culpability
attaches when an individual consciously disregards a risk to society. GLANVILLE WIL-
LIAMS, CRIMINAL LAw: THE GENERAL PART 259 (2d ed. 1961). The strict liability defen-
dant is precluded from arguing that he has not consciously taken such a risk. His
positive efforts and good intentions are irrelevant because he has caused the prohibited
harm. Thus, an individual may act exactly as a reasonable member of the society would
act under the same circumstances but nonetheless be branded as a criminal. "There is
no reason to believe that he is anything worse than unlucky, and no reason to single him
out for disapproval." Kelman, supra note 7, at 1515.
133 While a strict liability defendant can be deterred if one broadens the time frame
and prohibits them from engaging in any activity that could result in criminal violations,
"such deterrence might come at great social cost." Simmons, supra note 90, at 507
n. 152 (1992); cf. Posner, supra note 7, at 209 (comparing economic effects of strict liabil-
ity laws to negligence laws).
134 The objection to strict liability is not that it punishes people who are liter-
ally helpless to avoid committing the act, because it is obvious that they
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More fundamentally, the strict liability doctrine violates utilita-
rian theories of criminal punishment because an individual who has
no basis for believing he is engaging in unlawful conduct will not be
deterred from engaging in that behavior. If an individual has no
indication that he is doing anything wrong until the harmful act is
completed, then he has no reason to alter his conduct. 135
Given the conflicts with both the retributivist and utilitarian
theories of punishment, it is understandable why opponents of strict
liability do not want to use the doctrine against defendants who
have made an affirmative effort to comply with the law but have
been misled into committing a violation. Classic Anglo-American
legal philosophy is that "[i]t is better that ten guilty persons escape
than one innocent suffer."' 3 6 Strict liability theory operates from
the opposite perspective. Under the strict liability doctrine, an occa-
sional innocent may be punished to assure the safety of the majority.
Thus, the prosecution of good faith defendants under strict liability
laws appears to conflict with the most fundamental principles ofjust
punishment.137
D. Traditional Alternatives to the Strict Liability Doctrine
While many have recognized the possible injustice in holding
defendants who have operated under a reasonable mistake of fact
could have avoided the possibility of liability by not going into business
in the first place. The point is that selling meat or managing a factory,
[for example], is a productive activity which the law means to encourage,
not discourage, and we should not punish people who have taken all rea-
sonable steps to comply with the law.
Johnson, supra note 1, at 1521.
135 This was also Judge Devlin's conclusion in Reynolds v. G.H. Austin & Sons Ld.,
[1951] 2 K.B. 135, 150 (Eng.). Inflicting a penalty on a person who could not have
reasonably known the relevant circumstances is senseless.
Such a penalty could have no effect on other persons in the future, which
is one of the main purposes of the criminal law, because if they did not
know what the facts were when they acted, then there could be no mens rea
on their part. How can pressure be put on a person, who is in no way
thoughtless or inefficient, to take greater care than he has already taken?
A.L. Goodhart, Possession of Drugs and Absolute Liability, 84 LAw Q. REv. 382, 385 (1968).
136 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 73 (2d ed. 1972).
137 As Professor Packer stated:
[T]o punish conduct without reference to the actor's state of mind is both
inefficacious and unjust. It is inefficacious because conduct unaccompa-
nied by an awareness of the factors making it criminal does not mark the
actor as one who needs to be subjected to punishment in order to deter
him or others from behaving similarly in the future, nor does it single him
out as a socially dangerous individual who needs to be incapacitated or
reformed. It is unjust because the actor is subjected to the stigma of a
criminal conviction without being morally blameworthy. Consequently,
on either a preventative or a retributive theory of criminal punishment,
the criminal sanction is inappropriate in the absence of mens rea.
Packer, Mens Rea, supra note 1, at 109.
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criminally liable, there has been little success in remedying the
problem. Over time, courts have tried a variety of approaches to
bring the strict liability doctrine in line with common law notions of
moral culpability.138 At best, these efforts are awkward; at worst,
they widen the philosophical gap between strict liability's propo-
nents and opponents.
1. Reinterpreting Statutes
The first approach courts have taken to modify the effects of the
strict liability doctrine is to "reinterpret" strict liability statutes to
require mens rea.13 9 The Supreme Court's decision in Morissette v.
United States 140 illustrates this approach. On its face, the statute in
Morissette did not require intent. Defendant Morissette was charged
with converting government property in violation of federal law.141
Morissette, a junk dealer, discovered spent bomb casings that had
been lying about for years and sold them to a city junk market.
When charged with unlawful conversion, Morissette claimed an
honest belief that the Air Force had abandoned the casings. The
trial court, while recognizing that this claim of right would be a full
defense to an ordinary theft charge, took the view that it was not a
defense to a violation of the federal statute. The statute contained
no language requiring an intent to steal, which is the traditional
mens rea of theft.
The Supreme Court disagreed. It held that because the conver-
sion appeared related to the common-law crime of theft, the com-
mon-law requirement of intent should be implied in the statute.
The Court ruled that absent clear legislative history or statutory lan-
guage to the contrary, statutes akin to common-law crimes should
be interpreted as requiring a culpable mental state.
In reaching its conclusion, the Court acknowledged that it had
previously held that intent is not required for a limited group of
"public welfare" offenses.' 42 However, it narrowly viewed this cate-
gory of offenses to include only those offenses for which the punish-
ment was relatively small and conviction did not pose a grave threat
to the offender's reputation. 143 The Court declined to draw a line
138 See Abrams, supra note 15, at 463-75.
139 This was the approach adopted in the Keating case. See supra part I.B.
140 342 U.S. 246 (1951).
141 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1988) (same language as 1948 enactment) provides in pertinent
part: "Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his use or the use
of another ... [a] thing of value of the United States or of any department or agency
thereof... [s]hall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned more than ten years,
or both ......
142 Morissette, 342 U.S. at 255-56.
143 Id. at 256.
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between those crimes requiring a mental state and those lacking
such a requirement.' 44 It warned, however, that courts generally
should be reluctant to interpret a statute as a strict liability crime.
145
In the Court's opinion, such statutes are not the best method to reg-
ulate behavior because they are based primarily on an interest in
"efficiency of controls."1 46
Given the Morissette holding, tone, and general discussion of the
nature of criminal laws, 147 many courts not surprisingly view the de-
cision as a license to interpret statutes with harsh penalties as im-
plicitly requiring a culpable mens rea. Courts are particularly apt to
take this approach when the defendant in a strict liability case prof-
fers a mistake of fact defense.
148
Yet, reinterpreting statutes does not address the most difficult
cases where a defendant is charged with a crime that the courts have
acknowledged to be a strict liability offense. Even if the defendant
asserts a reasonable and honest mistake of fact, the trial court can-
not legitimately infer a mens rea requirement. For example, in Kan-
tor the offense was dearly intended to be a strict liability crime,
144 Id- at 260.
145 Id. at 263.
146 It. at 254-56.
147 Reflecting the judicial system's general discomfort with strict liability offenses,
Justice Jackson wrote in Morissette:
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted
by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and
persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will
and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose be-
tween good and evil. . . . As the states codified the common law of
crimes, even if their enactments were silent on the subject, their courts
assumed that the omission did not signify disapproval of the principle but
merely recognized that intent was so inherent in the idea of the offense
that it required no statutory affirmation.
Id. at 250, 252.
148 See, e.g., Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985) (interpreting statute
prohibiting unauthorized use of food stamps as requiring defendant to know his usage
was unauthorized); States v. Williams, 872 F.2d 773 (6th Cir. 1989) (interpreting federal
statute prohibiting transfer of unregistered fully automatic weapon as requiring knowl-
edge of the weapon's fully automatic nature); United States v. Sherbondy, 865 F.2d 996
(9th Cir. 1988) (interpreting federal statute providing for enhanced punishment for pos-
session of a firearm by person convicted of three violent felonies as requiring "knowing"
possession); Reynolds v. State, 655 P.2d 1313 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (interpreting stat-
ute prohibiting fishing in closed waters as requiring proof of defendant's negligence);
People v. Stuart, 302 P.2d 5 (Cal. 1956) (interpreting statute prohibiting preparation,
compounding, and selling of an adulterated and misbranded drug as requiring mens
rea); Noble v. State, 223 N.E.2d 755 (Ind. 1967) (interpreting statute prohibiting notary
public from falsely attesting affidavit as requiring criminal intent); McCallum v. State,
567 A.2d 967 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990) (interpreting statute prohibiting driving a mo-
tor vehicle with a suspended license as requiring mens rea); People v. Irving, 203
N.Y.S.2d 531 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960) (interpreting statute prohibiting automobile owner to
allow unlicensed driver to operate vehicle as requiring proof of owner's knowledge that
the operator was unlicensed).
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given the statute's language and its legislative history. The legisla-
ture removed the word "knowingly" from the statute when the Jus-
tice Department protested that such a requirement would permit a
mistake of fact defense. The conference committee accepted the
House version of the bill excluding any mention of mens rea "with
the intent that it is not a necessary element of a prosecution that the
defendant knew the actual age of the child."' 149 To require a mens
rea, the court would have to rewrite the statute, which the Ninth
Circuit refused to do.' 50 Instead, the court applied the good faith
defense.
Reinterpreting statutes may be the most popular approach em-
ployed by courts, but it is not the most intellectually honest.' 5 '
When legislative intent is clear,152 another approach is needed to
reconcile strict liability crimes with the common-law notion of crimi-
nal culpability.
2. Attacking Actus Reus and Causation
An alternative method courts have employed to avoid imposing
criminal liability judgment on nonculpable individuals is to attack
149 H.R. REP. No. 811, 95th Cong., 1stSess. 5 (1977),reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
69, 69; S. REP. No. 601, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977).
150 United States v. United States Dist. Court, 858 F.2d 534, 542 (9th Cir. 1988).
The court wrote: "[A]lthough we may 'strain to construe legislation so as to save it
against constitutional attack,' we 'must not and will not carry this to the point of per-
verting the purpose of a statute ... or judicially rewriting it.'" Id at 542 (quoting
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 841 (1986)).
151 For example, in the recent case of United States v. Speach, 968 F.2d 795 (9th
Cir. 1992), the defendant was charged with unlawful storage of hazardous waste in viola-
tion of 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A) (1988) and unlawful transportation of hazardous waste
in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(1) (1988). Defendant asserted that the trial court
erred in prohibiting evidence as to his mistaken belief that the hazardous material facili-
ties had been licensed. The Ninth Circuit held that the trial court's interpretation of the
statutes as strict liability crimes was erroneous and that the jury must find that defendant
knowingly and willfully used an unlicensed facility. In dissent, Judge Rymer noted that
although the majority's approach was tempting on fairness grounds, prior Ninth Circuit
decisions had already addressed the scienter requirement of a parallel clause of the of-
fense and found it did not require this proof of knowledge.
Likewise, in United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425 (3d Cir. 1986), both the govern-
ment and concurrence urged the court to avoid the constitutional issue of whether a
felony prohibiting the sale of protected species (16 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)) violates due pro-
cess by inferring a scienter requirement from the statutory scheme and congressional
purpose. Id. at 431. The majority refused to do so holding that "supply[ing] an element
of specific intent here would be impermissible 'judicial legislation.'" Id (quoting
United States v. Engler, 627 F. Supp. 196, 199 (M.D. Pa. 1985)).
152 The trend, in fact, is toward express declarations by legislatures that an offense is
a strict liability crime. Singer, supra note 1, at 387. See, e.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-
3-205(1)(b)(I) (West Supp. 1992) ("If a person ... drives a motor vehicle while under
the influence of alcohol or one or more drugs, . . . and this conduct is the proximate
cause of a serious bodily injury to another, he commits vehicular assault. This is a strict
liability crime.") (emphasis added).
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the actus reus component of the crime. 153 While a strict liability
crime does not require a culpable mental state, it does require a
voluntary criminal act. 154 Additionally, the defendant's act must
constitute a "proximate cause of the alleged violation."' 55
The existence of an actus reus requirement allows a defendant
charged with a strict liability offense to invoke the defense that he
acted involuntarily. If a defendant acts involuntarily, for instance,
by reflex or in an automatic state, he cannot commit a strict liability
crime regardless of his mental state.' 56 An example of this defense
is when a defendant charged with speeding claims he was acting in-
voluntarily during an epileptic fit and that he did not know he was
prone to such seizures. 157
The involuntary act defense, however, also does not address the
concerns raised in the most troublesome strict liability cases. In
these cases, defendants consciously perform acts but do so because
of deception. For instance, the producers in Kantor could hardly
claim unconsciousness or involuntary action. While these individu-
als lack an actus reus defense, they are nonetheless not fully culpa-
ble for their conduct' 58
Another related defense is that the defendant did not "proxi-
mately" cause the harmful act. For example, in Kilbride v. Lake,' 59
the defendant was charged with failing to display a certificate of fit-
ness on his automobile. The parties agreed that the defendant had
placed such a certificate on his vehicle, but that the wind or individ-
ual had removed it. Rather than impose strict liability for failure to
display the certificate, the court found that the defendant had not
153 See PAUL ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES 265 n.26 (1984); Brady, supra note
9; Kadish, supra note 1, at 259.
154 This may be an affirmative act, an act of omission, or an act of possession in
some circumstances. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 (Am. Law Inst. 1962).
155 Note, Developments in the Law, supra note 5, at 1262.
156 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Involuntary Acts and Criminal Liabil-
ity, 81 ETHics 332, 340-42 (1971). For more on how the actus reus component encom-
passes part of the element of a crime, see Ingrid Patient, Some Remarks about the Element of
Voluntariness in Offences of Absolute Liability, 1968 CRIM. L. REV. 23, 32.
The British courts have employed this defense as a way of avoiding the strict liability
doctrine for serious criminal offenses, including the unlawful possession of narcotics.
See Regina v. Warner, [1968] 2 W.L.R. 1303, 1345 (Eng.) (no "possession" (i.e., actus
reus) if another person slipped narcotics into defendant's bag without his knowledge).
157 But see People v. Decina, 138 N.E.2d 799, 803-04 (N.Y. 1956) (holding that one
who was previously aware of epileptic condition is negligently culpable for later
accident).
158 Kadish, supra note 1, at 268.
159 1962 N.Z.L.R. 590 (N.Z. P.C.); see also Hill v. Baxter, [1958] 1 Q.B. 277 (Crim.
App. 1957) (Eng.) (defendant claimed he blacked out prior to accident and therefore did
not cause it).
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caused the illegal condition and therefore could not have violated
the statute. 160
Like the actus reus defense, the causation defense has limited
use for strict liability crimes. If a defendant is directly involved in
the prohibited action, the defense is unavailable. It certainly would
be of no avail to the defendants in the Kantor case who hired Lords
and produced the films. 16 1 Another approach is required for such
cases.
3. Relying on Prosecutorial Discretion
Instead of turning to judicially recognized defenses, the crimi-
nal justice system might rely on prosecutors to use their discretion
to refrain from charging strict liability defendants who proffer an
honest and reasonable mistake defense. 62 The Kantor court had a
cogent response to this suggestion: "[I]f law enforcement officials
could always be trusted to do the right thing, there need never have
been a Bill of Rights."' 163
Much of strict liability law, including the Kantor case, has
evolved from unrestrained prosecutorial discretion.164 There are
many pressures on prosecutors to bring strict liability cases to court.
160 See generally R.S. Clark, Accident-Or What Became of Kilbride v. Lake, 1984 EssAYs
ON CRIM. LAw 47 (proposing that limited causation defense in Kilbride be extended to
general "accident defense" to strict liability crimes).
161 An offshoot of the causation defense is the current application of the "responsi-
ble share" doctrine raised in vicarious liability cases. In such cases, if a supervisory de-
fendant is going to be held accountable for the acts of those in his charge, he may argue
that he was powerless to control their behavior. Thus far, the defense has been limited
to the corporate situations, in which the defendant has direct involvement with the of-
fense's actus reus. But see infra note 297 and accompanying text.
162 Consider the Supreme Court's response in United States v. Dotterweich, 320
U.S. 277, 285 (1943), to the argument that strict liability could be used to apprehend
those who had no knowledge or reason to know of illegal activity: "Our system of crimi-
nal justice necessarily depends on 'conscience and circumspection in prosecuting of-
ficers .... "" Id. at 285 (citation omitted).
163 United States v. Kantor, 677 F. Supp. 1421, 1435 n.64 (C.D. Cal. 1987), aff'd sub
nom., United States v. United States Dist. Court, 858 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1988). Similarly,
when the argument was made by the majority in United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S.
277, 285 (1943), that "the good sense of prosecutors" could be relied upon to assure
fair application of strict liability statutes, Justice Murphy replied in his dissent, "that
situation is precisely what our constitutional system sought to avoid." Id. at 292 (Mur-
phy, J., dissenting).
164 Cases indicating the failure to exercise responsible prosecutorial discretion in-
clude: State v. White, 464 N.W.2d 585 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (charging defendant with
illegally employing a 17 year old female as nude dancer in adult bookstore even though
she produced a false identification card, successfully repeated the information on the
card to the defendant, and the signature on the I.D. card matched the female's signature
on her W-4 form); Noble v. State, 223 N.E.2d 755 (Ind. 1967) (charging defendant, a
notary public, with making a false attestation; alleged illegal practices prevailed at the
license office for many years due to administrative necessity); People v. Hemandez, 393
P.2d 673 (Cal. 1964) (government charging defendant with statutory rape; prosecutrix
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First, these cases usually involve offenses labeled public welfare or
morality crimes and therefore draw intense public scrutiny. Politi-
cally, it may be quite difficult for a prosecutor-often an elected offi-
cial-to ignore the enforcement of these offenses. 165 Second,
because the funding and prestige of prosecution offices is often
based upon the number of cases handled and the prosecution's win-
loss record,166 the pursuit of strict liability crimes can often assure
the prosecutor of an impressive conviction box score.
Kantor and Keating are prime examples of why prosecutorial dis-
cretion cannot be relied upon to temper the use of the strict liability
doctrine. In both cases, extreme political pressure encouraged the
prosecutors to charge the defendants under a strict liability theory,
despite the fact that the defendants faced ten years injail. The pros-
ecution also zealously resisted efforts by defendants to present evi-
dence of their good faith factual mistake. These cases, and many
others,167 show that political realities make reliance on prosecutorial
restraint an unrealistic solution.
4. Minimal Punishment
Finally, several commentators have supported the imposition of
minimal sentences on strict liability offenders to soften the impact of
the doctrine. 168 While many courts, operating from the directive in
was 17 3/4 years old, had been defendant's companion for several months, and had
voluntarily consented to sexual relations with him).
165 Empirical evidence supports the claim that agencies feel bound to provide a sym-
bolic display of authority and thus prosecute the "big case" even in the absence of
blameworthiness. See KErrH HAWKINS, ENVIRONMENT AND ENFORCEMENT 202 n.11
(1984). See also United States v. Charnay, 537 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, Davis
v. United States, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976).
[A strict liability statute] imposes a heavy responsibility upon the prose-
cutor. Many are his potential targets and few are the standards by which
the exercise of his discretion can be measured .... Whatever his decision, it
is likely to be one in keeping with the political realities within which he functions.
This is a part of the price that this type of statute compels us to pay.
Id at 357 (Sneed, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
166 JOSEPH F. LAWLESS,JR., PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 26, § 1.29 (1985) (detailed
prosecution records, including prosecution office's "batting average," are kept for
"budgetary concerns and self-aggrandizement"). See, e.g., id. at Appendix § 1.33 (Data
Summary Table from the Report of the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia).
167 See supra note 164 and infra note 261.
168 See, e.g., Brady, supra note 9 (arguing that degree of punishment for strict liability
crimes should be proportional to the culpability); Nemerson, supra note 9 (proposing
strict liability system when punishment varies by culpability; if strict liability defendant
has little or no culpability, little or no punishment should be imposed); cf. Albert LEvitt,
Extent and Function of the Doctrine of Mens Rea, 17 ILL. L. REV. 578, 579 (1923) ("[IThe
intent of the so-called criminal is not an element of the crime he commits; but.., is a
definite element which needs to be considered when the criminal is to be punished
1993] 433
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Morissette,169 will generally use the strict liability theory only when
the defendant faces minimal punishment, relying on this alternative
is unwise. First, not all judges will interpret leniently a strict liability
statute or exercise sentencing discretion to impose minimal
sentences on strict liability defendants. Judges face political pres-
sure and may prefer the strict liability doctrine for the same reasons
it is preferred by prosecutors.
Second, the federal government and many states currently limit
the discretion of the sentencingjudge.' 7° Thus, even if a judge may
wish to reduce the sentence of the strict liability defendant who
made good faith efforts to prevent the crime, the court may be un-
able to do so under applicable sentencing guidelines.' 7 ' Sentencing
guidelines limit courts to a range of incarceration periods from
which to sentence a defendant.' 72 While a court may depart from
these guidelines in extraordinary cases, the defendant has no legal
right to such departure. Given the sentencing guidelines, it is highly
likely that defendants such as those in Kantor 173 will serve several
years in prison if convicted of their strict liability crimes.
Moreover, apart from the lengthy sentences that many strict lia-
bility defendants face under state and federal sentencing guide-
lines,'74 the stigma attached to the application of any form of
criminal sanction argues against the imposition of even minimal in-
169 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1952) (holding that, as to legisla-
tion that does not require proof of criminal intent, "penalties commonly are relatively
small, and conviction poses no grave damage to an offender's reputation").
170 See infra note 174.
171 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines adopted in 1987 were enacted in large part
to "minimize the discretionary powers of the sentencing court." FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL 1, Introduction and General Application Principles, The Statutory Mission 1
(1992) [hereinafter SENTENCING GUIDELINES].
172 The range for the statute in the Kantor case, for example, is zero to fifteen years
in jail, depending on defendant's prior criminal record. 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d) (1988).
However, given the facts of that case, the actual guideline range was 57 to 137 months,
depending on defendants prior criminal record. SEr'ENCING GUIDELINES, supra note
171, at 132, Sexual Exploitation of a Minor, § 2G2.1 (1992).
173 The criminal conduct in the Kantor case took place prior to the effective date of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Thus, the Kantor trial judge would have been able to
exercise discretion at sentencing. In contrast, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines limit
the sentencing discretion of trial judges for identical criminal offenses following the No-
vember 1, 1987 effective date.
174 "At the end of 1988 twenty states had adopted determinative or presumptive
sentencing." Jane W. Williams, Sentencing Guidelines-A Selective Bibliography of State Mater-
ials, 10 LEGAL REFERENCE SERVICES Q., nos. 1/2, 7 (1990). Since that time at least three
additional states have adopted sentencing guidelines: Pennsylvania, Louisiana, and
Tennessee. In Kansas, guidelines are pending before the legislature. Finally, at least
four other states have established commissions to develop sentencing guidelines: North
Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, and Texas. Kay A. Knapp & Denis J. Hauptly, State and
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Apples and Oranges, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 679, 681 (1992).
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carceration. 175 The strict liability defendant gains little solace in the
knowledge that he is only a short-term criminal. He is still punished
even though the rationales underlying criminal punishment are not
served. Like the other current alternatives to the strict liability doc-
trine, minimizing punishment does not address the core problem:




THE GOOD FArrH DEFENSE
A. The Good Faith Defense: The Foreign Experience
In searching for a better alternative, we should look beyond the
parameters of our own criminal justice system. Other countries
have reconciled more effectively the strict liability doctrine with gen-
eral principles of moral culpability. These countries employ a
"good faith" or "halfway house" defense to the strict liability doc-
trine. The experience of these countries may prove beneficial in de-
ciding whether the good faith defense should be adopted in our
jurisdiction.
1. The British Experience-The "Halfway House" Defense
The good faith defense to strict liability crimes emerged abroad
in an era of mistrust: mistrust by the courts of a criminal justice
system that valued expediency over theories of personal culpability;
mistrust in an explosion of criminal legislation that criminalized
wrongs traditionally handled in the civil courts.
177
In the earliest period of criminal law, the mental state of the
wrongdoer mattered little, if at all.1 78 As a general rule, courts
could find a defendant guilty without a showing of culpable mental
state. Hence, the need to develop a good faith defense did not exist
because a defendant's mental state was generally irrelevant.
This model of strict liability offenses governed in England
throughout the feudal period. However, the influence of canon law
175 See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
401, 405 (1958) (criminal punishment amounts to a "formal and solemn [societal] pro-
nouncement of... moral condemnation").
176 Cf Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) ("Even one day in prison
would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold."); see
also Hippard, supra note 1, at 1045 (asserting that justifying strict liability crimes as
merely regulatory measures and not actual crimes is ludicrous).
177 See generally Singer, supra note 1, at 340-60 (tracing the historical development of
strict liability crimes).
178 J.W.C. Turner, The Mental Element in Crimes at Common Law, 6 CAMBRIDGE LJ. 31,
34 (1936-38); Anne F. Noyes, Note, Early Cduses and Development of the Doctrine of Mens Rea,
33 Ky. LJ. 306 (1945).
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in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries led to the development of
the concept of moral culpability as an essential element of crime.1 79
For the next three hundred years, the common law required mens
rea as an element of a criminal offense.
The resurgence of strict liability offenses began in the nine-
teenth century.180 This tentative recovery brought with it, however,
the seeds of the good faith defense. In Regina v. Tolson,' 8' the defen-
dant was charged with bigamy. Traditionally, courts treated bigamy
statutes as classic strict liability offenses.18 2 In Tolson, the defendant
claimed that sources had informed her that her husband, who had
deserted her five years earlier, had drowned in a shipwreck. Accord-
ing to the statute, the defendant was guilty regardless of whether
she knew her husband was still alive.
Writing for the court, Justice Wills avoided the strict liability
issue by reinterpreting the statute as requiring a mens rea in that
case.18 3 He did not focus on the language of the statute, which was
to the contrary, or on the legislative intent. Rather, he returned to
the general principles of culpability for criminal law: " 'It is a princi-
ple of natural justice and of our law that' . .. [t]he intent and act
must both concur to constitute the crime."18 4 While willing to rec-
ognize strict liability crimes, the court found that bigamy, under the
179 Remington & Helstad, supra note 113, at 648.
180 See generally Singer, supra note I (reviewing the modem history of strict liability
law). In English law, at least three categories of crimes were acknowledged as strict
liability offenses: (a) regulatory offenses penalizing quasi-criminal acts (e.g., adultera-
tion of tobacco and food, and violation of game laws); (b) acts which amount to public
nuisances in aggravating circumstances; and (c) acts which amount to summarily en-
forced civil torts, but were more expeditiously enforced in criminal courts. Peiris, supra
note 1, at 119. English courts have also employed strict liability principles in the sen-
tencing of many other crimes, including offenses such as conspiracy. See infra note 189.
Regina v. Woodrow, 15 M. & W. 403, 153 Eng. Rep. 907 (Ex. 1846), represents the first
modem strict liability case. In that case, the defendant was charged with possessing
tobacco adulterated with sugar, molasses and other saccharine matter, in violation of the
Tobacco Act, 1842, 5 & 6 Vict., ch. 93, § 3 (Eng.). The Court of Exchequer held that
knowledge of adulteration was unnecessary and denied defendant's defense based on
ignorance of tobacco adulteration.
181 23 Q.B. 168 (1889) (Eng.).
182 Note, Strict Liability Crimes, 33 NEB. L. REV. 462, 463 (1956) (citing Common-
wealth v. Mash, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 472 (1844); The Queen v. Tolson, 23 Q.B. 168 (1889)
(Eng.)).
183 He wrote:
It seems to me to be a case to which it would not be improper to apply
the language of Lord Kenyon, when dealing with a statute which literally
interpreted led to what he considered an equally preposterous result, "I
would adopt any construction of the statute that the words will bear, in
order to avoid such monstrous consequences." (Fowler v. Padget, 7 T.R.
509, 514 (1798) (Eng.)).
Tolson, 23 Q.B. at 177.
184 Id. at 172 (quoting Fowler v. Padget, 7 T.R. 509, 514 (1798) (Eng.)).
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particular facts of the case, did not constitute a strict liability
offense. 18
5
In a concurring opinion Justice Cave took a slightly different
approach. He reinterpreted the very nature of strict liability crimes.
He found them to be offenses that generally do not require proof of
the defendant's mens rea, but still allow for a good faith defense
when necessary to preserve the moral sense of the statute.186 Under
this interpretation, a strict liability statute merely creates a presump-
tion that a defendant had unlawful intent. The defendant could re-
but that presumption with proof of an honest and reasonable belief
that her husband was dead before she remarried.' 87 In essence, the
strict liability nature of the offense merely shifted the burden to the
defendant to adduce the proof of her mistake.
While many courts continued reinterpreting statutes, 18 8 Justice
Cave's reinterpretation of the nature of strict liability crimes drew a
following.'8 9 In Sherras v. De Rutzen, 190 the court interpreted a stat-
185 Thus, while the court acknowledged that there was "no doubt that under the
circumstances the prisoner [fell] within the very words of the statute," Tolson, 23 Q.B. at
171, the court nonetheless chose for that particular case to reinterpret the statute as
requiring a "tainted mind." Id at 180.
186 Id at 181-84.
187 Id. at 183.
188 See, e.g., Lim Chin Aik v. The Queen, 1963 App. Cas. 160 (P.C. 1962) (Eng.)
(appeal taken from Sing.), in which the court refused to classify an offense as strict liabil-
ity because the defendant was powerless to avoid the violation.
But it is not enough in their Lordships' opinion merely to label the stat-
ute as one dealing with a grave social evil and from that to infer that strict
liability was intended. It is pertinent also to inquire whether putting the
defendant under strict liability will assist in the enforcement of the regu-
lations. That means that there must be something he can do, directly or
indirectly, by supervision or inspection, by improvement of his business
methods or by exhorting those whom he may be expected to influence or
control, which will promote the observance of the regulations. Unless
this is so, there is no reason in penalising him, and it cannot be inferred
that the legislature imposed strict liability merely in order to find a
luckless victim.
Id at 174.
189 The acceptance of the good faith defense doctrine was not surprising given the
extreme applications of strict liability. In England, the prosecution could prove even
conspiracy charges involving public welfare offenses, without proving the defendant's
culpable knowledge. See, e.g., Regina v. Sorsky, 30 Crim. App. 84, 89-90 (1944) (Eng.)
(seller charged with conspiracy even though ignorant that contract would be for an
amount of goods in violation of agent's quota).
190 [1895] 1 Q.B. 918 (Eng.). In Sherras, the defendant was charged with supplying
liquor to a constable on duty, in violation of the Licensing Act, 1872, 35 & 36 Vict., ch.
94, § 16 (Eng.). Law enforcement officers routinely frequented the defendant's pub,
located across the street from the police station. However, the police constables cus-
tomarily removed their armlets when off-duty. The defendant served one particular
constable who had removed his armlet even though he was still on duty. Defendant was
convicted of violating the Act. On appeal, the Queen's Bench quashed the conviction
and found the defendant not guilty because he acted on a reasonable and bona fide
belief that the police constable was off-duty.
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ute that had been held to create a strict liability offense. Trying to
reconcile a statute carrying no mens rea requirement with the gen-
eral concept that criminal liability requires moral blameworthiness,
Justice Day held that the absence of no mens rea requirement only
shifted the burden of proof and did not render knowledge irrele-
vant.1 9 1 Similar to Judge Kozinski in Kantor and Justice Cave in Tol-
son, the court viewed the strict liability doctrine as a valid procedural
shortcut for prosecutors so long as it did not damage the basic con-
cept of criminal culpability.192
British courts have adopted Justice Cave's good faith defense
and refer to it as the "halfway house" approach. 19 It is so called
because the approach is half way between a traditional negligence
crime (which imposes the burden on the prosecution to prove that
the defendant acted carelessly) and a strict liability offense (which
prohibits the defendant from assuming the burden of proving he
acted with care). The approach does not impose the burden on the
prosecution to prove that the defendant intentionally acted below
standards. Instead, it permits the defendant to assume the opposite
burden of proving that he acted without a culpable intent.
In some ways, British courts are still experimenting with their
version of the good faith defense. The defense is not applied in
every strict liability case. Individual courts decide whether to permit
the defense depending on the nature of the case.' 94 If the court
allows the defense, the crime is a "strict liability" offense. However,
if the court denies the defense, the crime is an "absolute liability"
offense. 195
191 Sherras, [1895] 1 Q.B. at 921.
192 Others continue to see the good faith or mistake of fact defense in the same light.
In his article on strict liability, Professor Abrams does not view strict liability as dispens-
ing with the culpability approach. Rather, he views the doctrine as relieving the prose-
cutor of proving culpability in particular cases. Abrams, supra note 15, at 473-74.
193 The proposed "halfway house" alternative to traditional strict liability also has
been referred to in American criminal jurisprudence. Professor Packer uses the term to
describe criminal liability based upon negligent behavior. Packer, Mens Rea, supra note
1, at 109-10 (citing GLAEviLLE WILLIAMs, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 271
(1953)). Professor Packer's proposal differs from the British approach to halfway house
offenses in that the British proposal places the burden of proof on the defendant to
prove non-negligence.
194 English courts do not appear to rely on a set group of factors to decide whether
to allow a halfway house approach in a particular case. Rather, the British courts employ
an ad hoc approach. Courts may consider both the effect of the statute on those in the
industry and the fairness of applying strict liability to the individual defendant. Peiris,
supra note 1, at 120; see also Reynolds v. G.H. Austin & Sons LD., [1951] 2 K.B. 135, 147-
48 (Eng.) (DevlinJ.). Additionally, there is emphasis on the plain, literal, and grammati-
cal meaning of statutory provisions. Id. at 149.
195 See Yahuda, supra note 1, at 330-31.
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The House of Lords' decision in Sweet v. Parsley 196 is an interest-
ing example of the British approach. In Sweet, the landlord of a
farmhouse was charged with managing premises used for the pur-
pose of smoking cannabis or cannabis resin, in violation of Section
5(b) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1965.197 The defendant, a school
teacher in Oxford, owned the farmhouse, but did not occupy it and
rarely visited it. When she did visit, she only entered the rooms of
her tenants upon invitation. She had no knowledge that her tenants
smoked cannabis in the house until the police executed a search
warrant and found cannabis resin and L.S.D. in the garden and
kitchen. Nonetheless, the defendant was convicted because she
managed a premise where cannabis was smoked.
While sympathetic to Sweet's situation, the trial court faced a
serious dilemma. Three years before the instant appeal, a court
found the same offense to be a strict liability offense for which the
defendant's intent was irrelevant.'98 Relying on precedent, the divi-
sional court upheld defendant's conviction.
The House of Lords disagreed. At first, Lord Reid suggested
that he would simply reinterpret the statute.'9 9 However, he did not
follow this familiar course, but instead turned to the good faith de-
fense as developed in British law:
The choice would be much more difficult if there were no
other way open than either mens rea in the full sense or an abso-
lute offence; for there are many kinds of case [sic] where putting
on the prosecutor the full burden of proving mens rea creates
great difficulties and may lead to many unjust acquittals. But
there are at least two other possibilities. Parliament has not infre-
quently transferred the onus as regards mens rea to the accused,
so that, once the necessary facts are proved, he must convince the
jury that on balance of probabilities he is innocent of any criminal
intention.... The other method would be in effect to substitute
in appropriate classes of cases gross negligence for mens rea in
the full sense as the mental element necessary to constitute the
crime.... It may be that none of these methods is wholly satisfac-
tory but at least the public scandal of convicting on a serious
196 [1970] 1 App. Gas. 132 (1969) (Eng.) (appeal taken from Q.B.).
197 Id. at 134. The Act states: "If a person ... is concerned in the management of
any premises used [for the purpose of smoking cannabis resin]; he shall be guilty of an
offense against this Act." Dangerous Drugs Act, 1965, ch. 15, § 5b.
198 See Yeandel v. Fisher, [1966] 1 Q.B. 440 (Eng.). The Dangerous Drugs Act cre-
ates an absolute offense in the case of the manager of a premises used for smoking
cannabis.
199 He wrote, "It does not in the least follow that when one is dealing with a truly
criminal act it is sufficient merely to have regard to the subject matter of the enactment.
One must put oneself in the position of a legislator." Sweet, [1970] 1 App. Gas. at 149.
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charge persons who are in no way blameworthy would be
avoided.
20 0
Thus, Lord Reid viewed the good faith defense as an alternative, on
par with imposing a mens rea requirement, for alleviating the harsh
effects of the strict liability doctrine when applied to an individual
lacking personal culpability. 201
Lord Morris of Borth-Y-Gest agreed with the decision. In lan-
guage foreshadowing Judge Kozinski's reasoning in Kantor, Lord
Morris argued that because Parliament had not expressly barred a
mens rea requirement, the court could engraft a mens rea defense
onto the statute.20 2 Focusing on the powerlessness of the defendant
to avoid conviction, Morris argued that guilt would not attach by
reason of carelessness but instead because of "the unknown act of
some unknown person whom it had not been found possible to con-
trol."203 Refusing to hold a defendant responsible for acts beyond
her control, the court allowed evidence of her mens rea.
Not all British judges accepted the good faith defense. In his
concurring opinion in Sweet v. Parsley, Lord Pearce rejected the half-
way house approach citing the hurdle posed by Woolmington v. Direc-
200 Id. at 150.
201 Lord Reid had one year earlier in Regina v. Warner, [1969] 2 App. Gas. 256
(1968) (Eng.) (appeal taken from C.A.), analyzed the strict liability doctrine. In that
case, Lord Reid acknowledged the theoretical basis for a good faith defense, but reinter-
preted the statute on narrower grounds. Id. at 280. Nonetheless, in analyzing the theo-
retical operation of a halfway house defense, Lord Reid made several important
observations. First, he noted that the defense would not be a far-reaching doctrine be-
cause it is based upon an objective test: "not whether the accused knew, but whether a
reasonable man in his shoes would have known or have had reason to suspect that there
was something wrong." Id. Second, Lord Reid emphasized that the defense would be
limited because the burden would be on the defendant to prove the absence of mens
rea. Id Finally, Lord Reid rebutted what might be the greatest underlying concern
about the defense-submitting to a jury the issue of the reasonableness of the defen-
dant's actions:
"The truth appears to be that a reluctance on the part of courts has re-
peatedly appeared to allow a prisoner to avail himself of a defence de-
pending simply on his own state of knowledge and belief. The reluctance
is due in great measure, if not entirely, to a mistrust of the tribunal of
fact-the jury. Through a feeling that, if the law allows such a defence to
be submitted to the jury, prisoners may too readily escape by deposing
conditions of mind and describing sources of information .... It is not
difficult to understand such tendencies, but a lack of confidence in the
ability of a tribunal correctly to estimate evidence of states of mind and
the like can never be sufficient ground for excluding from inquiry the
most fundamental element in a rational and human criminal code."
Id. at 274 (quoting Thomas v. The King, 59 C.L.R. 279, 309 (1937) (Austl.)).
202 Lord Morris wrote: "Even if, contrary to my view, it is not affirmatively enacted
that there must be mens rea I cannot read the wording as enacting that there need not
be mens rea." Sweet, [1970] 1 App. Cas. at 156.
203 Id. at 155.
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tor of Public Prosecutions.2 0 4 Although he extolled the virtues of the
good faith defense, Lord Pearce's reading of Woolmington compelled
him to reinterpret the statute as requiring proof of criminal
intent. 20
5
In Woolmington, the trial court shifted the burden to the defen-
dant to prove his innocent state of mind at his murder trial.206 In-
sisting that the prosecution carry the burden of proof, the high
court noted that the "golden thread" in criminal law is that the
prosecution must prove the defendant's guilt.2 0 7 Forcing the defen-
dant to prove his innocent state of mind would relieve the prosecu-
tion of its burden.
It is ironic that Lord Pearce cited Woolmington as a reason for
not adopting the halfway house approach.208 Both the holding in
Woolmington and the halfway house approach are designed to assist
defendants charged with criminal liability. They simply do so in dif-
ferent ways. Contrary to Lord Pearce's assumption, Woolmington
need not be interpreted as an immovable obstacle to employing the
halfway house defense. First, the "halfway house" defense imposes
no extra burden on the defendant. Under the current strict liability
doctrine, there is already an irrebuttable presumption of defen-
dant's culpability. If anything, the halfway house reduces the defen-
dant's burden by offering him an opportunity to rebut the
allegations against him. Second, even if the good faith defense was
204 1935 App. Cas. 462 (Eng.) (appeal taken from Crim. App.). Lord Pearce indi-
cated that he thought the "sensible half-way house" approach should be used if it could
be reconciled with Woolmington. On its face, however, Lord Pearce read Woolmington as
establishing the rule that the burden of proof as to intent could not be shifted to the
defendant. Thus, at least for the case before him, Lord Pearce rejected the half-way
house defense and chose to interpret the statute as having a mens rea requirement.
Sweet, [1970] 1 App. Gas. at 157-58.
205 Sweet, [1970] 1 App. Gas. at 157-58.
206 Defendant Woolmington shot and killed his estranged wife. There were no eye-
witnesses to the shooting. At trial, the defendant claimed the shooting was accidental.
He testified that he had rigged a gun inside his coat to show his wife he intended to
commit suicide if she did not return. When defendant opened his coat, the gun went off.
The trial judge instructed the jury that the prosecution must prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the victim had died at the defendant's hands. If the prosecution proved this
point, the burden shifted to the defendant to prove the shooting was accidental. Ulti-
mately the jury convicted the defendant of murder. On appeal, the House of Lords held
that the trial judge erred in his instruction.
[W]here intent is an ingredient of a crime there is no onus on the defen-
dant to prove that the act alleged was accidental .... If ... there is a
reasonable doubt... as to whether the prisoner killed the deceased with
a malicious intention, the prosecution has not made out the case and the
prisoner is entitled to an acquittal.
Woolmington, 1935 App. Gas. at 481.
207 Id
208 Justice Dickson noted this irony in the seminal Canadian case on the good faith
defense, The Queen v. City of Sault Ste. Marie, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299, 1315-16 (Can.).
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viewed as adding a burden on the defendant, both British and
American courts explicitly recognized statutory exceptions to the
general rule that the burden of proof lies with the prosecution.20 9
Therefore, in courts where the judge is unwilling to reinterpret
strict liability statutes, the "halfway house" or good faith defense
may not only be the better alternative but the only recourse for a
defendant facing a presumption of culpability.
The British experience shows that the good faith defense is a
viable alternative to troublesome applications of the strict liability
doctrine. However, it does not provide a complete model for Amer-
ican courts to follow because the British courts have yet to adopt a
consistent or coherent application of the defense. 210 Rather, it ap-
pears to offer British courts an escape hatch when they feel com-
pelled to impose strict liability on an individual for whom
punishment seems inappropriate.
2. Canadian Law
The Canadian courts apply the good faith defense more con-
sistently than the British courts. 211 In Canadian courts, the good
faith defense is the rule, not the exception. 212 This "midway point"
defense strikes a balance between "penalising offences which have
209 In Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977), the Supreme Court held that the
legislature may shift the burden of proof onto the defendant to prove an affirmative
defense, such as extreme emotional disturbance, because the statute did not make the
defendant's mental state an element of the crime charged. Id. at 207-09. It is often
difficult, however, to distinguish between elements defining the offense and elements
constituting an affirmative defense. See Cooper v. North Carolina, 702 F.2d 481, 484
(4th Cir. 1983) (holding that federal courts will employ functional analysis to determine
whether a state has impermissibly incorporated absence of an affirmative defense into
elements of a crime). Nevertheless, once a court decides that a circumstance is not an
element of the offense, the burden of proof as to that circumstance, including the defen-
dant's mental state, may be shifted constitutionally to the defendant. Patterson, 432 U.S.
at 210.
210 For example, even though Lord Diplock found that Woolmington did not bar such
a defense, he avoided the defense in Sweet. Rather, he found that the offense in question
contained a mens rea requirement. Sweet v. Parsley, 1970 App. Cas. 132, 164-65 (ap-
peal taken from Q.B.) (Eng.). English law on strict liability crimes and good faith de-
fenses remains unsettled. See also Singer, supra note 1, at 379 n.197 (arguing that unlike
Canada and Australia, England has not taken the "halfway position" in strict liability
offenses). See generally PETER SEAGO, CRIMINAL LAW (83 (1981) (acknowledging that Eng-
land has not yet adopted the good faith defense).
211 In 1978, the Canada Supreme Court decided The Queen v. City of Sault Ste.
Marie, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299 (Can.), in which it recognized a good faith defense and
adopted the recommendation of the Canadian Law Reform Commission limiting the
strict liability doctrine in Canadian criminal law. LAw REFORM COMM'N OF CANADA,
STUDIES IN STRicT LIABILITY (1974). The Law Commission of Canada concluded "that
in the regulatory law strict liability be replaced by negligence and that the law as a mini-
mum allow a defence of due diligence with a reverse onus of proof." Id. at 37.
212 Peiris, supra note 1, at 124; The Queen v. Roliff, 11 C.C.C.2d 10, 11 (Ont. C.A.
1973) (Can.); The Queen v. Ooms, 11 C.C.C.2d 69, 70 (Sask. C.A. 1973) (Can.).
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in fact been committed but are difficult or impossible to prove, and
the risk of punishing an innocent defendant." 213 Canadian courts
even allow a defendant to enter a plea that "a man, intending to do
a lawful act, does that which is unlawful acting upon an honest and
reasonable belief."214 As a consequence, the Canadian criminaljus-
tice system contains a category of offenses that are essentially quasi-
criminal and punished accordingly.215
Canadian courts do not believe that strict liability offenses must
be, by definition, crimes without a mens rea requirement. Rather,
they view such offenses as creating a legal presumption of culpabil-
ity that may be overcome.2 16 Canadian courts employ a "prepon-
derance of probabilities" standard with the good faith defense. In
essence, the courts place the burden on the defendant to show that
he operated in good faith. Furthermore, the defendant must prove
this proposition by a preponderance of the evidence-a standard
less demanding than the clear and convincing standard adopted by
the Kantor court for the good faith defense.2 17
While the majority of Canadian courts accept the good faith de-
fense, some judges have been unwilling to abandon the concept of
absolute liability altogether.218 If the offense is relatively minor and
carries only a monetary penalty, some courts will find that the public
interest in protecting against the harm created, combined with the
costs of allowing a good faith defense, outweigh the defendant's in-
213 Peiris, supra note 1, at 124.
214 The Queen v. Finn, 8 C.C.C.2d 233, 236 (Ont. C.A. 1972) (Can.).
215 Peiris, supra note 1, at 124-25. The defendant's plea under the halfway house
solution is considered a plea to a criminal offense, but to one that warrants less punish-
ment. The Canadian courts have, in essence, created an intermediate category of of-
fenses. Id
216 Id
217 The preponderance of evidence standard requires evidence of greater weight
than the evidence offered in opposition; that is, evidence which as a whole shows that
the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not. Braud v. Kinchen, 310 So. 2d
657, 659 (La. Ct. App. 1975). The dear and convincing proof standard, used in United
States v. United States Dist. Court, 848 F.2d 534, 543 (9th Cir. 1988), aff'g United States
v. Kantor, 677 F. Supp. 1421 (C.D. Cal. 1987), requires proof that results in reasonable
certainty of the truth of the ultimate fact in controversy. Lepre v. Caputo, 328 A.2d 650,
652 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1974). Therefore, the clear and convincing proof standard requires
more evidence than the preponderance of the evidence standard, but less evidence than
the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard.
218 Nova Scotia and Manitoba have rejected the halfway house solution to strict lia-
bility crimes. However, the acceptance of the doctrine by Ontario and New Brunswick
represents the established law of Canada. Peiris, supra note 1, at 125. Additionally, the
Canada Supreme Court held that imprisonment for an absolute liability offense is a dep-
rivation of liberty not "in accordance with the precepts of fundamental justice" guaran-
teed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Thus, the good faith defense
must be the rule, not the exception. Ref. Re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act,
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 (Can.).
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terest in being punished only for culpable behavior.2 19 In these sit-
uations, Canadian courts may bar the use of the good faith defense.
In the past, it has been difficult to predict when a Canadian
court would classify an offense as a strict liability crime instead of an
absolute crime. Factors considered have included: (1) the severity
of the penalty imposed for the offense; (2) the likely effect of a crimi-
nal conviction on the defendant's position and reputation in the
community; (3) the impact of using the defense on the legislative
objective of the statute; (4) the degree of danger posed by defen-
dant's acts; (5) the overall regulatory pattern in the subject matter of
defendant's crime; 220 (6) whether defendant's crime involved affirm-
ative acts or omissions;22' and (7) the amount of difficulty prosecu-
tors face in enforcing a particular penal provision.
222
More recently, however, the Canada Supreme Court has held
that absolute liability crimes exposing defendants to mandatory im-
prisonment violate the fundamental rights of Canadians under the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 223 Prior to that deci-
sion, the Canadian courts used an ad hoc system to decide when to
allow a good faith defense.2 24 Each individual judge would act as a
"superlegislature," overriding legislative intent when he wanted to
allow a good faith defense. This case-by-case system imposed tre-
mendous requirements on the judiciary, consuming valuable and
limited judicial resources. It also resulted in a system where differ-
ent judges treated the same crime differently.2 25 In response to
these problems, the Canada Supreme Court held that absolute lia-
bility crimes mandating a period of imprisonment should generally
be seen as violating fundamental justice and that a good faith de-
fense should be permitted.2 26 The Court did not set forth, however,
219 Peiris, supra note 1, at 129-30. Canadian courts have accepted absolute liability
(strict liability without a halfway house defense) in limited areas including: marketing
and safety regulations, sale of alcoholic beverages to children, unlawful trading in secur-
ities, and some aspects of environmental laws. Id.
220 If there is a tradition of disallowing evidence of good faith, the defense will not
be permitted.
221 Omissions are rarely categorized as absolute liability offenses.
222 Peiris, supra note 1, at 126.
223 Reference Re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486
(Can.).
224 Allan C. Hutchinson, Sault Ste. Marie, Mens "Rea and the Halfway House: Public Wel-
fare Offences Get a Home of Their Own, 17 OsGoODE HALL L.J. 415 (1979).
225 See Jacques Fortin, PatrickJ. Fitzgerald & Tanner Elton, Strict Liability in Law, in
LAW REFORM COMM'N OF CANADA, STUDIES ON STRiCT LIABILITY 157, 176 (1974) (com-
paring two Canadian cases with nearly identical facts treated differently for mens rea
requirement).
226 There was an express caveat, however, to the Court's broad holding that abso-
lute liability crimes should not result in imprisonment. The Court held that in extreme
cases, like those arising out of "exceptional conditions, such as natural disasters, the
outbreak of war, epidemics, and the like," the absolute liability doctrine could be used
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the quantum of proof required to satisfy the good faith defense nor
whether, as in Kantor, the defendant must make affirmative efforts to
discern the truth.
227
Because the United State Supreme Court is unlikely to rule that
strict liability crimes as a class are unconstitutional, 228 the Canadian
model provides an instructive but not readily adaptable approach
for American courts. American courts need a means to identify
those cases that warrant a good faith defense and a model for how
that defense would operate.
3. Australian Law
While derivative of English law, 229 the Australian legal system
has always been more consistent in its approach to strict liability
crimes and the good faith defense. In over sixty years, only three
courts have denied the defense. 23 0 Australian law goes beyond a
halfway house approach by accepting a prima facie rule that reason-
able mistake of fact will exonerate common law and statutory of-
fences without discrimination. 23' More than the courts of any other
Commonwealth jurisdiction, Australian courts employ a good faith
defense for offenses they deem "strict liability" offenses. 232 Even
clear statutory text is treated in Australia as having "no other effect
than throwing on the defendant the burden of exculpating himself
even if the defendant was to be punished with incarceration. Reference Re Section
94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act. [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, 518 (Lamer, J.).
227 Peiris, supra note 1, at 131. Moreover, following its decision in Motor Vehicle Act,
the Canada Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a criminal or regulatory
offense is invalid because it places the burden on the defendant to establish his own due
diligence. R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc., 84 D.L.R. (4th) 161 (1991). At least four
justices believed that placing the burden on the defendant to prove due diligence would
invalidate a statute. Id Five other members of the court, however, left open the possi-
bility that a presumption of negligence is valid for regulatory crimes. There is therefore
an open question in Canada as to whether the good faith defense will remain the pre-
ferred option or the Canadian courts will require the prosecution to prove a culpable
mens rea. See Editorial, Regulatory Offences, 34 CRIM. L.Q. 257 (1992) (analyzing Wholesale
Travel Group); Patrick Healy, Criminal Law-Strict and Absolute Liability Offences-The Role of
Negligence-Presumption of Innocence and Reverse Onus-Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Sections
7, 11; Competition Act, Sections 36, 37.3: R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc., 64 CANADLAN B.
REV. 761 (1990) (same); see also Chris Tollefson, Ideologies Clashing: Corporations, Criminal
Law, and the Regulatory Offence, 29 OSGOODE HALL LJ. 705 (1991) (discussing ideological
debate arising from treatment of Canadian strict liability crimes).
228 See infra part III.B.1.
229 Colin Howard, Strict Responsibility in the High Court of Australia, 76 LAw Q. REv.
547, 549 (1960).
230 All three cases involved a private claim, of a business nature, against another
individual. Brown v. Green, 84 C.L.R. 285, 294 (1951) (Austl.); Duncan v. Ellis, 21
C.L.R. 379 (1916) (Austl.); Spooner v. Alexander, 13 C.L.R. 704 (1912) (Austl.).
231 Peiris, supra note 1, at 131.
232 Id. at 132-33.
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by showing that he acted under a reasonable mistake of fact."'2 8
Unless the legislation expressly prohibits the defense, Australian
courts will allow the defense by implication. 2 4
Australian courts are also clearer on the operation of the good
faith defense. 2 5 First, the burden remains on the defendant to
show by a "balance of probabilities" 23 6 that he or she had both an
honest and reasonable mistake of fact.2 3 7 Second, the courts have
indicated the degree of care required to satisfy the reasonableness
component: "[I]f the accused had means of knowledge which he
ought to have used but of which he did not in fact avail himself, his
omission to do so is culpable in a sense which excludes the advan-
tage of the defence. ' 238 Thus, the defendant must take affirmative,
reasonable steps to learn the truth in order to employ the good faith
defense.
Limited critical analysis exists as to the effect of the good faith
defense on strict liability prosecutions in Australia. 23 9 To the extent
there has been criticism, it has focused on the lack of case precedent
supporting the presumption of a good faith defense. 240 However,
commentators generally have praised the doctrine as a means of re-
jecting crude estimates of probability. 24' The Australian courts re-
fuse to label haphazardly some offenses as strict liability and others
233 Id. at 132; Maher v. Musson, 52 C.L.R. 100, 105 (1934) (Austl.) (Dixon, J.).
234 Peiris, supra note 1, at 132. Master Butchers Ltd. v. G. Laughton & Coombs Ltd.,
19 C.L.R. 349, 350 (1915) (Austl.) (Griffith CJ.), aff'g G. Laughton & Coombs Ltd. v.
Master Butchers Ltd., 1915 S.A.L.R. 3, 12-13 (S. Austl.).
235 See generally Howard, supra note 229, at 549 (Australian courts interpret strict lia-
bility statutes as placing burden on defendant to rebut negligence by presenting affirma-
tive proof of reasonable mistake).
286 Gherashe v. Boase, 1959 V.R. 1 (Vict.); The Queen v. Reynhoudt, 107 C.L.R.
381, 399 (1962) (Austl.) (Menzies J.); see Howard, supra note 229, at 565.
237 Not all courts and commentators agree that "reasonableness" should be a re-
quirement; many argue that an honest mistake is sufficient. Peiris, supra note 1, at 134-
35. The prevailing view, however, is that the mistake must be objectively reasonable in
order to limit the defense.
28 Id. at 135; see also Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Lennard's Carrying Co., [1914] 1
K.B. 419, 432 (1913) (Eng.).
239 Proudman v. Dayman, 67 C.L.R. 536 (1941) (Austl.), generated most of this
commentary. In that case, the high court of Australia analyzed the classic absolute liabil-
ity offense of driving a car without a license. The High Court unanimously decided that
mens rea was not an ingredient of the offense did not decide the question of whether the
good faith defense applied. Proudman generated a series of articles on the theoretical
effects of a good faith defense on strict liability crimes in Australia. See Brent Fisse,
Vicarious Responsibility in Regulatory Offences, 44 AusTL. LJ. 601 (1970); Brent Fisse, The
Elimination of Vicarious Responsibility in Regulatory Offences, 42 AusTL. LJ. 250 (1968); Den-
nis Rose, Vicarious Liability in Statutory Offences, 45 AusTL. LJ. 252 (1971); Dennis Rose,
Vicarious Liability in Regulatory Offences, 44 AusTL. LJ. 147 (1970); AJ. Hannan, Note, Mens
Rea in Statutory Offences, 16 AusTL. LJ. 91 (1942).
240 See Hannan, supra note 239.
241 The few commentaries that do address the issue praise the defense as allowing
the courts to establish a doctrine based on the probability of defendant culpability. W.B.
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as negligence.242 Instead, they use the good faith defense to deter-
mine the probability that the defendant deserves punishment. No-
tions of moral culpability override concerns for judicial efficiency.
4. New Zealand Law
Strict liability law in New Zealand is like that in Australian law,
with one crucial difference. Although both countries recognize a
good faith defense, 243 a defendant in New Zealand need assert only
a reasonable basis for his mistake, after which the burden shifts to
the government to prove the absence of a mistake.244 Defendants
need not make reasonable efforts to ascertain the truth nor prove
their mistakes by a balance of probabilities.245
As a result, there is greater disagreement in New Zealand as to
the validity of the good faith defense. 246 If defendants can shift the
burden of proof to the prosecution simply by raising a reasonable
basis for a mistake, more 'defendants will employ the defense, thus
rendering judicial strict liability proceedings inefficient. Many
courts in New Zealand therefore consider the alternative of adopt-
ing a good faith defense that requires the defendant to prove the
absence of culpability.2 47 Because of a lack of uniformity in how the
New Zealand good faith defense operates, this Article endorses an
approach more akin to the Australian model than to that of New
Zealand: the defendant must prove that he took all reasonable steps
to avoid the illegal results.2 48
5. South Asian and African Codified Systems
Finally, both commonwealth Asian and African countries recog-
nize a good faith defense to strict liability crimes.2 49 Unlike in the
Fisse, Probability and the Proudman v. Dayman Defence of Reasonable Mistaken Belief, 9 MELB.
U. L. REv. 477 (1974).
242 Reynolds v. State, 655 P.2d 1313 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (reinterpreting strict
liability statute that prohibits fishing in closed waters as requiring at least a showing of
negligence); State v. Kremer, 114 N.W.2d 88 (Minn. 1962) (reinterpreting strict liability
statute prohibiting motorist from running red light to require showing of negligence).
243 Peiris, supra note 1, at 136.
244 Id at 138.
245 Id
246 See Janet November, Unreasonable Mistakes and Mens Rea, 1990 N.Z. L.J. 130. For
an example, see generally Cato, supra note 86 (discussing halfway house defense). For a
discussion of the mens rea debate and how it applies to strict liability narcotics offenses in
New Zealand, seeJ.M. Conradson, Mens Rea in Relation to Drug Offences, 2 OTAGO L. REv.
131 (1969-72).
247 Pieris, supra note I, at 138 ("[I]n the typical case of public welfare offence, the
courts of New Zealand have required little persuasion.., that initiative by the accused in
demonstrating lack of fault should not be barred."); see, e.g., Ministry of Transport v.
Burnetts Motors Ltd. [1980] 1 B.Z.K.R. 51, 57-58 (N.Z. C.A.).
248 See infra part III.B.3.4.
249 Peiris, supra note 1, at 139.
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United States, 250 the penal codes for these nations expressly recog-
nize the defense.2 51 For example, the Penal Code of Ghana pro-
vides that no person is punishable for any act that, by reason of
ignorance or good faith mistake of fact, he believes to be lawful.
2 52
In these jurisdictions the good faith defense is not novel or in-
novative. Rather, strict liability is defined not only to tolerate, but
to embrace, a good faith defense. As a result, the doctrine faces
little challenge or second-guessing as to whether it properly bal-
ances utilitarian needs and fairness concerns.
While American legislatures could adopt this approach, such a
proposal is politically unrealistic. Lawmakers who want to be
"tough on crime" will not enact laws creating defenses for fear of
being viewed as "soft." More likely, the courts will take the lead in
ensuring that defendants charged with a strict liability crime are
punished only if they deserve criminal punishment.
253
250 A survey of American state statutes indicates that they will adopt one of the fol-
lowing five approaches when interpreting the mens rea requirement of statutory crimes:
(1) Generally presume that a criminal offense requires proof of mental
culpability; see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 4 (West 1988), MIcH. COMP.
LAws § 28.192 (1990), N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.5 (McKinney 1987), TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.01 (West 1974);
(2) Generally presume that a criminal offense requires proof of mental
culpability, but allow an exception for criminal "violations," see e.g.,
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-204 (Michie 1987), DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 253
(1987), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 4-9 (1988), OR. REV. STAT.
§ 161.105 (1990);
(3) Reduce the grade and class of an offense if there is a showing of igno-
rance or mistake; see HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-219 (1985);
(4) Interpret each statute's mens rea by its language and intent, see KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-3201 (1988), MINN. STAT. § 610.02(9) (1987), Wis. STAT.
§ 939.23 (1982);
(5) No statutes on construction, see, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT., OHIO REV.
CODE ANN., OKLA. STAT., VT. STAT. ANN.
Currently, no state has a statute mentioning a general reasonable mistake of fact defense
to strict liability offenses. Some states, however, created such a defense for specific
crimes. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. 482.560 (1980) (good faith defense for driving with
suspended license).
251 For example, the Penal Code of India states: "Nothing is an offence which is
done by any person who is justified by law, or who by reason of a mistake of fact and not
by reason of a mistake of law in good faith, believes himself to be justified by law, in
doing it." INDIA PEN. CODE § 79, Act XLV of 1860, cited in Peiris, supra note 1, at 139
n.262.
252 GHANA CRIM. CODE 1960, art. 29, § 29(1), cited in Peiris, supra note 1, at 139
n.271
(A person who does or omits to do an act under an honest and reason-
able, but mistaken, belief in the existence of any state of things is not
criminally responsible for the act or omission to any greater extent that if
the real state of things had been such as he believed to exist.).
253 Because state judges are often elected officials, federal judges with lifetime ten-
ure may have to take the lead in creating a good faith defense. See, e.g., United States v.
United States Dist. Court [Kantor], 858 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1988), aff'g United States v.
Kantor, 677 F. Supp. 1421 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
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6. Summary of Foreign Experience
In developing a good faith defense, American courts need not
write on an empty slate. They can draw upon the experience of
those commonwealth countries that successfully apply the good
faith defense. 254 The use of the defense has been used successfully
by these nations and has not hindered their prosecutions. 255
Several aspects of the foreign approach are worth adopting in
the United States. First, courts should recognize that punishment is
improper in the absence of individual culpability. Under the current
American approach to strict liability law, this principle is often ig-
nored, creating a tangible risk that nonculpable persons will be pun-
ished. Second, the experience of other countries suggests that strict
liability offenses should be viewed as procedural mechanisms-re-
254 See generally CoLN HOWARD, STRICT RESPONSIBILITY (1963) (overview of strict lia-
bility in commonwealth countries; particular emphasis on Australian Criminal Codes); L.
H. LEIGH, STRICT AND VICARIOUS LIABILrrY: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE CRIMINAL LAW
(1982) (overview of strict and vicarious liability law in commonwealth countries).
255 For example, a study conducted by the Law Reform Commission of Canada in
1974 showed that "since 1968, federal statutes in the regulatory sector have tended to
include defenses of due diligence and reasonable care, without producing any great anx-
iety among the law-enforcers." See LAw REFORM COMM'N OF CANADA, STUDIES ON STRICT
LIABILrry 29 (1974).
Despite the large number of strict liability cases prosecuted in Canada, the study
shows that recognition of a due diligence/good faith defense does not unduly burden
the trial of strict liability crimes. Consider the statistics for the crime of misleading ad-
vertising with regard to price. The Combines Investigation Act, §§ 36-37, prohibits mis-
leading advertising with regard to price but permits a good faith defense. As diagramed
below, an analysis of prosecutions under those statutes indicates that the good faith
mistake is argued infrequently and does not impair prosecution.
PROSECUTIONS UNDER § 36
Total - 35
Mistake argued - 9 Mistake not argued - 26
Believed - 2 Not believed - 7
(Both Pleaded G)
Reasons for Proceeding - 3 No Reason Given - 4
(Plea G - 4)
Evidence No Evidence Other
Suggesting No Mistake - 7 supporting mistake - 1 1
1
(Plea G)(Plea G) (Plea G)
CORNELL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 78:401
buttable presumptions that relieve the prosecution from proving
mens rea in its case-in-chief.256 In ordinary cases, no evidence of
intent would be admitted at trial because of the legislative presump-
tion that the defendant acted negligently. However, in extraordi-
nary cases defendants could prove good faith mistake of fact.
Prosecutions Under § 37
Total - 65




I - Prosecution withdrawn)
Reasons for proceeding given - 9
Evidence suggesting
no mistake - 5
(2 pleaded guilty
3 acquitted)
Story Unbelievable - 2
(1 convicted after plea NG
1 prosecution withdrawn)
I
Not believed - 12






supporting mistake - 2
(1 pleaded guilty
I prosecution withdrawn)
PROSECUTIONS UNDER §§ 36 AND 37
Total - 100
Mistake argued - 231 Mistake not argued - 77
Not believed - 19
I
Reason for proceeding - 12
I
No reasons given for proceeding - 7
Evidence suggesting
no mistake - 8
I
No Evidence
supporting mistake - 3
Other reasons - 3
Even when defendants assert a good faith mistake defense, litigation was expedited by al-
lowing the defendants to plead "G" (guilty with a mistake).
256 See Goodhart, supra note 135, at 385 (viewing drug strict liability crimes in Eng-








Defendants could do this by proving that they operated under a mis-
take of fact and took reasonable and affirmative steps to avoid crimi-
nal activity.25
7
In order to tailor the good faith defense to the American system
and delineate its availability, we must understand -why the defense
has not been accepted by most American courts. The next section
describes how the American criminal justice system differs from
other legal systems, and why these differences must be considered
when proposing a good faith defense model.
B. Constructing a Good Faith Defense for American Courts
1. Traditional Strict Liability Law
Thus far, the American criminal justice system has not adopted
the commonwealth countries' approach to strict liability crimes.
American courts historically have viewed strict liability crimes as of-
fenses that do not permit an examination of an individual defen-
dant's moral culpability. State v. Gould, an 1875 decision by the Iowa
Supreme Court,258 is typical of the traditional view of strict liability
offenses. In Gould, the defendant was charged with obstructing a
highway by building a fence on the north line of his farm. Before
building the fence, the farmer relied on a survey obtained from the
county surveyor. The surveyor, however, incorrectly measured the
property. As a result, the defendant was convicted. The Iowa
Supreme Court summarily rejected the defendant's proposed good
faith defense: "The public cannot be deprived of, nor impeded in,
the right to the use of a highway because of the mistake, however
honestly made, of one who places an obstruction upon it. Such facts
would very properly be considered in mitigation of punishment, but
they do not show that no nuisance has been committed." 259 Strict
liability crimes, by definition, permitted no inquiry into the defen-
dant's mens rea prior to sentencing.260
This traditional rigid view of strict liability persists in American
law for several reasons. 261 First, American scholars generally attack
257 Moreover, in some situations (such as with absolute liability offenses) the risk of
harm to the public from the defendant's conduct far exceeds any injury that an innocent
could suffer by his conviction. Id at 385-86. For those crimes, the good faith defense
need not apply. See infra note 316 and accompanying text.
258 40 Iowa 372 (1875).
259 Id at 374.
260 See Commonwealth v. Dicken, 22 A. 1043 (Pa. 1891).
261 See, e.g., United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971) (holding that it is no defense
that the defendant did not know hand grenade in his possession was not registered);
United States v. Valencia-Roldan, 893 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1990) (ruling that govern-
ment is not required to prove that defendant knew age of minor to support conviction
for use of minor in cocaine distribution), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 935 (1990); United States
v. Pruitt, 763 F.2d 1256 (1lth Cir. 1985) (holding that government is not required to
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the strict liability doctrine as a whole, rather than looking for com-
promise doctrines, such as the good faith defense. For example, the
American Law Institute ("ALl") has rejected the strict liability doc-
trine in its entirety. 262 Under the Model Penal Code, in order to be
labeled a "crime," an offense requires proof of a culpable mental
state.263 Thus, scholarly groups have not embraced a "compro-
mise" good faith position, but have instead rejected the entire strict
liability doctrine. 264 In comments to the Model Penal Code, the ALI
calls for a "frontal attack" to abolish the criminal strict liability doc-
prove defendant was knowledgeable of age for conviction on distributing controlled
substances to persons under 21), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1084 (1986); United States v. Cat-
lett, 747 F.2d 1102 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that defendants, hunting migratory birds on
a baited field in violation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, were criminally liable even
though they were without knowledge that field had been baited), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1074 (1985); United States v. FMC Corporation, 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978) (ruling
that it is no defense to violation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act that defendant was not
aware of the lethal-to-birds quality of water in its pond); United States v. Kleiner, 663 F.
Supp. 43 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (holding that it is no defense to transportation of visual depic-
tion of minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct that defendant was unaware females
depicted were under 16); People v. Olsen, 685 P.2d 52 (Cal. 1984) (holding that defen-
dant's good faith belief that girl was over 16 years old is no defense to charge of lewd or
lascivious conduct with a child under 14); People v. Dillard, 201 Cal. Rptr. 136 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1984) (holding that belief firearm was not loaded is no defense to carrying loaded
firearm in public place); People v. Guinn, 196 Cal. Rptr. 696 (Cal. App. Dep't. Super. Ct.
1983) (holding that it is no defense that defendant bartender believed bar owner's cater-
ers permit was sufficient license for sale of alcoholic beverages); State v. Stiffier, 788
P.2d 220 (Idaho 1990) (ruling that defendant's reasonable belief that girl was at least 18
years old not a defense to statutory rape); State v. Tague, 310 N.W.2d 209 (Iowa 1981)
(holding that defendant's good faith reasonable mistake as to girl's age is not a defense
to the charge of having sex with a child under 14); McCallum v. State, 567 A.2d 967
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990) (holding that defendant's mistake in carrying the wrong auto-
mobile registration and license tags is no defense to several motor vehicle violations);
State v. White, 464 N.W.2d 585 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that defendant's mis-
taken belief that girl was over 18 is no defense to use of minor in sexual performances),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 77 (1991); State v. Fan, 445 N.W.2d 243 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989)
(ruling that defendant's belief girl was over 18 years old is no defense to offense of
employing a minor to engage in a sexual performance), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1030
(1990); State v. Vogel, 315 N.W.2d 324 (S.D. 1982) (holding that defendant's mistake of
law is no defense to strict liability crime of bail-jumping).
262 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05, cmt. 1 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955). Some com-
mentators have even suggested that the ALI's mode of attack on strict liability crimes
was politically motivated. See Walter Gordon, Strict Legal Liability, Upper Class Criminality,
and The Model Penal Code, 26 How. LJ. 781 (1983) (arguing that ALI's attack on strict
liability crimes and not the felony murder doctrine shows a bias in favor of the upper
class who is more susceptible to strict liability offenses).
263 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1962).
264 Legislatures have not adopted the MPC approach. Saltzman, supra note 1, at
1591. This frontal attack on the strict liability doctrine did come, however, with a major
reservation. If an offense does not carry the possibility of imprisonment, it may be la-
belled as a "violation" and strict liability doctrines employed. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.05, cmt. 1, at 140 (Am. Law Inst.) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955).
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trine.265 Legislatures, however, have not heeded this cry and strict
liability statutes still abound in American law. 266
265 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05, cmt. 1 (1962).
266 Child Protection Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1988 & Supp. 1991) (strict lia-
bility for depicting minors in sexually explicit conduct); Controlled Substances Act, 21
U.S.C. § 859 (Supp. 11 1990) (strict liability for sale of cocaine to minor; knowledge of
age of minor is irrelevant); Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(j) (1988)
(strict liability for loans and extensions of credit by a bank to its directors); Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1988 & Supp. 1990) (strict liabil-
ity for manufacturing, compounding, labeling, and distribution of fraudulent or harmful
foods and drugs); Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (1988 & Supp. 1990)
(strict liability for the hunting, taking, killing, possessing, selling, transporting of any
migratory bird, in whole or in part, covered by the treaty); National Firearms Act
Amendments of 1968, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841, 5861(d) (1988) (strict liability for possessing
handgrenade, unregistered firearm); Northern Pacific Halibut Act of 1982, 16 U.S.C.
§ 773 (1988) (strict liability for selling, transporting, possessing any fish covered by Act);
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1988) (strict liability for
failing to have certain warnings in a conspicuous place on every package of cigarettes
sold in the United States); Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1988)
(strict liability for obstructing, excavating, or filling any navigable water of the United
States unless approved by Army Corps of Engineers); Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authoriza-
tion Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1656 (1988 & Supp. 1990) (strict liability for oil spills); 18
U.S.C. § 1382 (1988) (strict liability for entering, where prohibited, military, naval, or
Coast Guard property);
ALAsKA STAT. § 16.05.340 (1992) (strict liability for failing to purchase tags prior to
hunting game or for failing to affix tags to game); CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 5650 (West
1984) (strict liability for depositing substances deleterious to fish, plant life, or bird life
into state waters); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25,100-25,249 (West 1992) (strict
liability for violating hazardous waste regulations), CAL. HEAL.TH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 26,619-26,621, 26,650-26,652 (West 1984) (strict liability for compounding or sell-
'ing adulterated or misbranded drugs); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 26,534 & 26,565
(West 1984) (strict liability for selling misbranded or adulterated food article); CAL. PE-
NAL CODE § 311.5 (West 1988) (strict liability for solicitation or creation of advertising
for or promotion of sale or distribution of matter represented by defendant to be ob-
scene [whether or not actually obscene]); Illinois Environmental Protection Act, ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 1111/2, paras. 1012, 1021 (1988 & Supp. 1992) (strict liability for hazard-
ous waste clean-up); MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 16-303 (Supp. 1992) (strict liability for
driving motor vehicle on suspended license); MD. TRANsP. CODE ANN. § 13-703 (1992)
(strict liability for unauthorized use of registration & license plate-mistake no defense);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-23(1) (1991) (prohibits possession of controlled substance
with intent to deliver; held to be strict liability offense in State v. Rippley, 319 N.W.2d
129 (N.D. 1982)-affirmative defense permitted in State v. Michlitsch, 438 N.W.2d 175
(1989)); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-6-1(c) (Michie 1984 & Supp. 1992) (permitting a child to
be placed in situation which endangers life or health, or to be cruelly punished; defined
as strict liability offense in State v. Lucero, 647 P.2d 406 (N.M. 1982) and State v. Cris-
lip, 796 P.2d 1108 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-43-31 (1988)
(prohibits bail-jumping; defined as strict liability offense in State v. Vogel, 315 N.W.2d
324 (S.D. 1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-31A-201 (1991) (strict liability for se-
curities agent operating without a license);
Additionally, at least seventeen states have strict liability statutory rape statutes:
CoLo. REv. STAT. § 18-3-406(2) (1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.021 (West 1992); HAWAII
REV. STAT. §§ 707-730, 707-731 (Supp. 1991); IDAHO CODE § 18-6101 (Supp. 1992);
IOWA CODE § 709.4 (1979); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:80 (West 1992); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17-A, § 254 (West Supp. 1991); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 265, § 23 (West
1990); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.788(4) (Callaghan 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.342
(West 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.020 (Vernon 1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-502
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Second, reluctance to adopt the good faith defense in the
United States stems from the fundamental change the doctrine
would have on the balance of power between legislatures and
courts. The Constitution balances the power of the three branches
of government-legislative, executive and judicial-by granting the
legislative branch the power to enact the laws, the executive branch
the power to enforce the laws, and the courts the power to interpret
the laws. By design, the separation of powers doctrine 267 limits
courts to interpreting criminal laws and ensuring that application is
consistent with legislative design and the Constitution.
268
In 1910, the Supreme Court in Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minne-
sota269 stated in dicta that a legislature may enact legislation that
does not allow a defense of good faith or ignorance.2 70 Ten years
later, in United States v. Balint,271 the Court reaffirmed that, by consti-
tutional design, courts should defer to the legislature's decision to
create an offense not requiring scienter.272 Accordingly, American
courts, driven by the duty to remain loyal to legislative intent and
constitutional imperative, have employed the strict liability doctrine
(1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:3 (1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11 (1992); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02 (Anderson 1975); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.326 (1990); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3102 (1983).
267 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishingjudicial review as
proper role ofjudiciary). See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUrONAL
LAw §§ 2-1, 2-2 (2d ed., 1988) (discussing separation of powers doctrine).
268 See State v. Monahan, 104 A.2d 21, 27 (N.J. 1954) (quoting Missouri, Kan. & Tex.
Ry. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904) (Holmes, J.))
[T]he determination as to what is the wise and acceptable approach from
society's viewpoint clearly rests with the other [non-judicial] branches of
government. Matters of statutory policy are the exclusive concern of the
legislative and executive branches which are fully accountable to the elec-
torate acting at the polls; and statutory enactments may not properly be
nullified in whole or in part simply because the judicial branch thinks
them unwise. It is well that we ever remind ourselves that in our democ-
racy the executive and legislative branches of government are the "ulti-
mate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great
a degree as the courts."
Id; see also Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J.
281, 317 (1989) (courts must defer as much as possible to legislatures when evaluating
constitutionality of statutes).
269 218 U.S. 57 (1910).
270 218 U.S. at 68-69. Shevlin, however, involved a civil fine rather than criminal
punishment.
271 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
272 Balint, 258 U.S. at 252.
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as the legislatures intended273-as an offense in which evidence of
intent cannot be admitted.274
Therefore, unlike their Commonwealth counterparts, American
courts are wedded to a constitutional tradition that allocates the re-
sponsibility of defining crimes to the legislature.275 If the legislature
explicitly defines a crime as one of strict liability, the court must or-
dinarily apply the statute as intended.276
2. Constitutional Limitations
A court's duty to remain loyal to legislative intent is not without
qualification. All prosecutions in the United States must conform to
the Constitution. If a constitutional provision bars prosecution
under a statute, the court must either strike down or modify the
statute.277
In the last thirty years, American courts, including the United
States Supreme Court, have recognized that in limited circum-
273 However, some courts (Kantor ificluded), suggest that the legislatures never re-
jected the good faith defense given the absence of express prohibitions on the defense.
This argument is somewhat disingenuous. Ordinarily, criminal statutes do not set forth
all of the defenses available to that particular offense. See Paul H. Robinson, Criminal
Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 199, 202 (1982) (arguing that treat-
ment of defenses in criminal law is unsystematic). Additionally, it is difficult to assume
that a legislature departs from clear tradition simply by failing to affirm expressly that
tradition.
274 See supra note 261.
275 By contrast, case law plays a dominant role in the development of criminal law in
commonwealth countries. RUPERT CROSS &J.W. HARRIS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAw 3-
4 (4th ed. 1991). The differences between the Commonwealth and American systems
may be more a matter of degree than of principle. Similar to the American courts, the
British courts also defer to a sovereign body, the Parliament, and its decree of laws.
However, the British system differs from the American system in that it accommodates
judicial development of both crimes and defenses:
English judges traditionally have been less inclined to defer unquestiona-
bly to legislation, particularly social reform legislation, than United States
judges.... The legal profession in England has bred an independent
and pervasive sense of what is right.... Social change is thought to be
introduced appropriately through the adaptation of precedent to new cir-
cumstances, not by means of legislation.... Although there is no dispute
that legislation is the source of law which has authority over all other
sources, the fabric of the common law is its precedent, and the vast
number of volumes of 'unwritten' law is the foremost distinguishing fea-
ture of the common law tradition.
MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 233-34 (1982). Within the
legislative body of Parliament is the High Court of Parliament, which interprets the laws.
See FREDERICK G. KEMPIN, JR., HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 17,
117 (3d ed. 1990). See generally CHARLES HOARD MCILWAIN, THE HIGH COURT OF PARLA-
MENT AND rrs SUPREMACY (1979) (reviewing the history of Parliament's legislative and
judicial power). England has no constitutional tradition of separation of powers that
requires a court to defer to legislative command.
276 See Farber, supra note 268.
277 See, e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152-53 (1959).
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stances, the Constitution may require that the defendant be afforded
a mens rea defense to a strict liability charge. 278 In Kantor, the court
authorized the defense based on the First Amendment. Because ap-
plication of the strict liability to the defendants in Kantor could chill
the free exercise of their First Amendment rights, the Ninth Circuit
permitted the defendants to assert a reasonable, honest mistake of
fact defense.
However, a broader constitutional basis supports the adoption
of some type of mens rea defense to strict liability crimes: the due
process clause. Courts and commentators have consistently misin-
terpreted Supreme Court law as upholding strict liability prosecu-
tions against any due process attacks. 279 Closer legal analysis
reveals no per se rule for all strict liability cases. Indeed, in some
situations due process may require the court to entertain a defense
to the strict liability crime. 280
The Court's decisions in Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota281 and
United States v. Balint 28 2 fostered much of the confusion regarding
the due process clause and the good faith defense. In Balint, de-
fendants were charged with unlawfully selling opium and a cocaine
derivative. The technical issue before the court was whether the in-
dictment should be quashed for failure to allege that the defendant
sold the controlled drugs knowing them to be such. The statute did
278 At least two state courts have rejected strict liability crimes as unconstitutional
violations of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See State v. Prince,
189 P.2d 993 (N.M. 1948); City of Seattle v. Ross, 344 P.2d 216 (Wash. 1959). Addi-
tionally, the Sixth Circuit held in United States v. Wulff, 758 F.2d 1121 (6th Cir. 1985)
that the two-year felony provision of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 707(b)(2) (1982), violated due process because it did not require proof of criminal
intent.
279 See, e.g., United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425, 433-35 (3d Cir. 1986) (court re-
jected due process attack even when the government conceded that a scienter require-
ment should be read into the statute); Stepniewski v. Ganon, 732 F.2d 567 (7th Cir.
1984) (court held strict liability home improvement trade practices violations do not
violate due process); United States v. Ayo-Gonzalez, 536 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1976) (court
held fishing violation does not violate due process), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1072 (1977);
Note, Criminal Lau-Lack of Knowledge and Intent Held No Defense to Criminal Prosecution, 107
U. PA. L. REV. 855, 856 (1959) (strict liability crimes not involving omissions not subject
to due process challenge); Comment, The Intent Element in Statutory Crimes, 2 DEPAUL L.
REv. 86, 88 (1952-53) (strict liability crimes not subject to due process challenge).
280 Due process, a broad concept, is subject to a variety of approaches and defini-
tions. A complete study of due process is beyond the scope of this Article, which focuses
only on concepts of substantive due process that the Supreme Court has already dis-
cussed in strict and vicarious liability cases. In general terms, the Court's discussion has
involved "the ordered liberty concept of due process." Hippard, supra note 1, at 1054.
Under this concept, strict criminal liability is unconstitutional because it is fundamen-
tally unfair to punish criminally an individual who was unaware his acts were wrong or
was unable to control their outcome. Id.
281 218 U.S. 57 (1910).
282 258 U.S. 250 (1922). A complete review of Shevlin and Balint can be found in
Saltzman, supra note 1, at 1592-95.
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not make such knowledge an element of the offense. The Court
held:
While the general rule at common law was that the scienter was
a necessary element in the indictment and proof of every crime
.. there has been a modification of this view.... It is a question
of legislative intent to be construed by the court. It has been ob-
jected that punishment of a person for an act in violation of law
when ignorant of the facts making it so, is an absence of due pro-
cess of law. But that objection is considered and overruled in
Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota .... 283
In 1910, the Supreme Court decided Shevlin. In Shevlin, defend-
ants unwittingly chopped down timber after their permit to do so
expired. The defendants faced a civil fine for their violation. The
Court rejected defendants' proffered good faith mistake of fact de-
fense and upheld the fine. The Court stated in dicta, which was re-
lied upon in Balint,284 that criminal prosecution against the
defendants would not violate due process. 28 5
More recently, however, the Supreme Court has indicated that
this rule may not be absolute. Two Supreme Court cases, United
States v. Dotterweich 28 6 and United States v. Park 287 suggest that a con-
stitutional basis for a good faith defense exists. Although the Court
upheld convictions in both cases, it developed the "responsible
share" doctrine, which resurrects the possibility of a due process
basis for the good faith defense. 288
283 Balint, 258 U.S. at 251-52 (citation omitted).
284 The Court's approach to the constitutionality of strict liability crimes in Balint
was more superficial than its discussion in Shelvin. The Court addressed the issue after
an presentation by the government. Packer, Mens Rea, supra note 1, at 113 n.29, (citing
Brief on Behalf of the United States at 5-11). The Court perfunctorily relied on its ear-
lier dicta in Sheulin and reversed the trial court's earlier demurrer of the indictment. See
id. at 113-16.
285 Shelvin, 218 U.S. at 69.
286 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
287 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
288 Another due process theory raised to challenge strict liability crimes has been
unsuccessful. In Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957), the Supreme Court re-
versed a defendant's conviction for failure to comply with a municipal criminal registra-
tion law. The defendant could not present evidence as to her lack of knowledge of the
ordinance. Emphasizing the passive nature of defendant's conduct, the court held that
the law violated due process because defendant did not have notice of the registration
requirement. Lambert, however, has been restricted to regulatory crimes involving omis-
sions and has not been expanded generally to cases involving an affirmative actus reus.
See United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425, 435 (3d Cir. 1986) (refusing to expand ruling
in Lambert to other strict liability crimes); Stepniewski v. Gagnon, 732 F.2d 567, 571
(7th Cir. 1984) (same). Courts have held that a crime requiring an affirmative act, unlike
one of omission, is more likely to "alert the doer to the consequences of his deed."
Engler, 806 F.2d at 435 (quoting United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 608 (1971)).
Thus, regulatory crimes involving affirmative acts do not violate the due process re-
quirement of notice. Mueller, supra note 3, at 1104 (Lambert applies only to strict liability.
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In United States v. Dottenveich,2. 9 Dotterweich, the president of a
corporation, 290 was charged with shipping mislabeled and adulter-
ated products. 29' Although the evidence did not establish that Dot-
terweich personally knew of or ordered the illegal behavior, the
Court upheld his conviction because the statute dispensed with the
requirement of awareness of some wrongdoing. Instead, the statute
placed "the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise in-
nocent but standing in responsible relation to a public danger." 292 Be-
cause of the defendant's "responsible share" in the success of the
transaction, his conviction was affirmed. 293 The court did not ad-
dress whether the defendant would have escaped liability absent a
"responsible share" in the success of the transaction.
crimes of omission which do not provide the defendant notice of wrong-doing); see also
Comment, Intent After Edmund v. Florida: Not Just Another Aggravating Circumstance, 64 B.U.
L. REv. 809, 818 (1985) (referring to Lambert as the most extreme of cases, not generally
followed by the Court).
Additionally, Lambert suggests that the Court did not preclude the establishment of
a good faith defense. The Lambert Court did not hold it per se unconstitutional to con-
vict a defendant who committed a strict liability crime by nonfeasance. Rather, it fo-
cused on "the [defendant's] failure to act under circumstances that should [not] alert the
doer to the consequences of his deed." 355 U.S. at 228. In allowing the defendant to
argue against his conviction, the Court addressed whether a reasonable person would
have taken affirmative steps under the circumstances to comply with the law. The good
faith defense has a similar focus.
289 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
290 Dotterweich was the president of Buffalo Pharmacal Company, Inc., a drug
wholesaler that purchased drugs from manufacturers, repackaged them under its own
label, and shipped them on order to physicians. Dotterweich and the company were
charged with two courts of interstate shipment of allegedly misbranded drugs and a
third count of shipping an adulterated drug. One shipment consisted of a cascara com-
pound that conformed to the specifications of the National Formulary, but whose labels
still included reference to an ingredient that had been dropped recently from the speci-
fied formula. The other shipment consisted of digitalis tablets, whose labels did not
reflect the lower potency of the product. The company did not manufacture either
product, and merely repackaged them under its own label. Dotterweich was not alleged
to have participated in the packaging of the drugs or to have known of their mislabeling.
"Guilt [was] imputed to [Dotterweich] solely on the basis of his authority and responsi-
bility as president and general manager of the corporation." Id. at 286 (Murphy, J.,
dissenting).
291 Id at 280-81.
292 Id. at 281 (emphasis added).
293 Commentators have debated whether Dotterweich was convicted under a strict
liability or vicarious liability theory. Compare Abrams, supra note 15, at 464-67 (referring
to "strict, vicarious liability"), with Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Liability of Corporate Of-
ficers for Strict Liability Offenses-Another View, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1337, 1348-57 (1982) (not-
ing ambiguity but supporting strict liability standard).
See also Packer, Mens Rea, supra note 2, at 118 (observing that Dotterweich opinion did
not make essential distinction between strict and vicarious liability). Given that the
Court analyzed the statute in Dotterweich as penalizing transactions "though conscious-
ness of wrongdoing be totally wanting," 320 U.S. at 284, it appears that the "responsible
share" doctrine may be applied whenever the defendant claims not to have culpable
knowledge of the charged acts, including in strict liability cases.
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United States v. Park more precisely defined "responsible share"
and its application to prosecutions under strict liability statutes.29
4
In Park, the government charged defendant with shipping adulter-
ated food. As manager of the offending corporation, the defendant
(who admittedly knew of the corporation's sanitation problems) was
convicted because of his responsibility, both in title and in fact, for
the corporation's acts. The Court wrote:
Dotterweich and the cases which have followed reveal that in pro-
viding sanctions which reach and touch the individuals who exe-
cute the corporate mission... the Act imposes not only a positive duty
to seek out and remedy violations when they occur but also, and primarily, a
duty to implement measures that will insure that violations will not occur.
295
The Court's approach to the responsible share doctrine in Park
is important for two reasons. First, the Court suggests that when a
defendant takes affirmative steps to prevent a legal violation but is
unable to do so, he should not be held accountable for the unlawful
act. 296 The individual who takes affirmative steps to comply with the
law and does not know of any wrongdoing has not acted in a morally
294 As Professor Abrams noted, "[tihe word 'responsible' itself reflects some notion
of culpability. Moreover, there is a way of thinking about strict liability and the concept
of a responsible share in the violative transaction that relates it to the idea of culpabil-
ity." Abrams, supra note 15, at 465. Professor Abrams used this concept to explain the
standard of criminal liability for corporate officers. This Article proposes to extend
these ideas to noncorporate contexts as well.
295 Park, 421 U.S. at 672 (emphasis added); cf Wasserstrom, supra note 1, at 741-45.
296 As the Court of Appeals found in reversing the Park conviction, due process fa-
vors "fairness and justice over ease of enforcement." United States v. Park, 499 F.2d
839, 842 (4th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 421 U.S. 658 (1975). Though the Supreme Court rein-
stated the conviction, the Court's "responsible share" or "reasonable relationship" test
returns the focus of the due process argument in strict liability cases to the issue of
whether the defendant can be blamed for the wrongful action. See FLETCHER, supra note
15, at 717-22.
The Court, in both Dotterweich and Park, failed to address the exact theory of due
process that would invalidate strict liability laws that unfairly imposed punishment. The
theory, however, is one deeply rooted in the Court's tradition:
Due process of law restrains a state from interfering with those rights
which are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"; from violating a
"principal ofjustice so deeply rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental"; from disregarding those
"immutable principles ofjustice which inhere in the very idea of free gov-
ernment" .... [Tihe due process clauses give the Court power to invali-
date state and federal legislation which in the opinion of the Court constitutes
an arbitrary or unreasonable interference with personal liberty and which
has no rational relationship to protection of the public health, safety,
morals or general welfare.
Note, Constitutionality of Criminal Statutes Containing No Requirement of Mens Rea, supra note
1, at 92-93 (footnotes omitted). Under this theory, legislatures may presume that prohi-
bition of a particular act is needed to protect society from particular harm. However, if
it can be shown that this presumption is irrational, the legislative enactment would lose
both its moral and constitutional force. See generally LIVINGSTON HALL & SHELDON
GLUECK, CRIMINAL LAw AND ITS ENFORCEMENT (2d ed. 1958).
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culpable manner. A fundamental principle behind the good faith
defense is that such an individual should not be punished.
Second, Park indicates the Court's willingness to look at the vi-
carious and strict liability doctrines as legislative mechanisms that
simply shift the burden onto a defendant to prove that avoiding the
violation was objectively impossible. 297 In Park, Chief Justice Bur-
ger wrote:
The Act does not, as we observed in Dotterweich, make criminal
liability turn on "awareness of some wrongdoing" or "conscious
fraud."... [B]ut the Act, in its criminal aspect, does not require
that which is objectively impossible. The theory upon which responsi-
ble corporate agents are held criminally accountable for "caus-
ing" violations of the Act permits a claim that a defendant was
"powerless" to prevent or correct the violation to "be raised defen-
sively at a trial on the merits." (citation omitted). If such a claim
is made, the defendant has the burden of coming forward with
evidence.... Congress has seen fit to enforce the accountability
of responsible corporate agents . . . in rigorous terms, and the
obligation of the courts is to give them effect as long as they do
not violate the Constitution. 298
The Park decision thus articulates the principle that while the legis-
lature may constitutionally employ mechanisms that shift the bur-
den to the defendant to show he was not culpable, due process does
not permit the prosecution of an individual who can assert an objec-
tive impossibility defense. 299 At some point, legislative presump-
297 As in Dotterweich, the Court in Park was unclear as to whether the president's
liability was based upon strict liability or vicarious liability. See supra note 292. In one
sense, the liability was vicarious because Park was being held liable for the failure of his
subordinates to take proper sanitation precautions. As other have argued, however,
Park was strictly liable because he personally failed to exercise the quality of care needed
in his business. Note, Developments in the Law--Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behav-
ior through Criminal Sanctions, supra note 5, at 1262 n. 102. The responsible share doctrine
may be applied to either type of crime, although it might be more difficult for the strict
liability defendant to show lack of knowledge or inability to control prohibited acts, be-
cause he is more directly connected to the unlawful events. For example, the defendants
in Kantor would have difficulty in showing that they did not know Lords' age and had no
way of learning it. Their direct contact with her would appear to place them on notice as
to her minority and give them ample opportunity to comply with the law. In Keating, on
the other hand, without direct contact with the investors, Keating would be more likely
to be mistaken about the representations his subordinates made to investors and less
likely to take actions necessary to prevent the fraud.
298 Park, 421 U.S. at 672-73 (emphasis added).
299 When a statutory presumption loses all rational connection between the facts
presumed and the facts proved, such as when it is objectively impossible for a defendant
to avoid violating the law, the statute becomes arbitrary and vulnerable to a due process
challenge.
[A] statutory presumption cannot be sustained if there be no rational
connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, if
the inference of the one from proof of the other is arbitrary because of
lack of connection between the two in common experience.
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tions must allow a defendant to rebut those facts that the law has
incorrectly presumed.3 00
In Park, the term "objective impossibility" did not require a de-
fendant to prove literal impossibility of avoiding a violation. Rather,
it meant that a defendant is entitled to a defense only if he can show
that despite his position of responsibility, (1) he did not know his
subordinates fell below legal standards, (2) a reasonable person in
his situation would also not have known, and (3) a reasonable per-
son would not have taken further steps to prevent the violation.3 0 '
If applied more generally, the Court's decision in Park would assist
defendants, such as those in Kantor or Keating, who argue that they
took all reasonable steps to ascertain those facts needed to comply
with the law but were misled in their efforts.30 2 If there was nothing
more a reasonable person could do to avoid a violation, the defen-
dant should be allowed to rebut the presumption that he is respon-
sible for the violation of law.
The Supreme Court's decision in Park also provides a prelimi-
nary model for the good faith defense. According to Park, a defen-
dant who is charged with an offense imposing a form of strict
liability can come forward with evidence to prove that preventing
the crime was objectively impossible.303 This evidence must show
not only that the defendant was unaware of the facts constituting the
crime, but also that a reasonable person in the defendant's situation
would not have been aware of those facts or have taken additional
steps to learn of them. Thus, Park places the burden on the defendant
Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467-68 (1943); see also Clarence E. Laylin & Alonzo
H. Tuttle, Due Process and Punishment, 20 MICH. L. Rav. 614, 614-15 (1921-22) (arguing
that no honest rationale exists for punishing a person incapable of complying with a
law).
300 Occasionally legislative assumptions regarding a defendant's conduct are so fac-
tually incorrect that creating an irrebuttable presumption leads to an unacceptable ratio
of errors. See Richard S. Bell, Decision Theory and Due Process: A Critique on the Supreme
Court's Lawmakingfor Burdens of Proof, 78J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 557 (1987); Ashford
& Risinger, supra note 107, at 174-86. While ordinarily the assumption that a defendant
who commits a strict liability act is blameworthy will be supported by the evidence in the
case, if sufficient facts disprove this, due process requires that the burden of proof be
shifted to express the true ratio of factual error for such cases. Bell, supra at 583-84.
Moreover, this Article argues that even if no constitutional basis for the good faith
defense exists, the defense is still an attractive and practical alternative for legislatures to
adopt. Using the defense would allow legislatures to avoid the current situation in
which the courts unpredictably redefine crimes to allow evidence of mens rea. Under
the current system, a prosecutor preparing for trial may not know until the time ofjury
instructions that the jury will be allowed to consider defendant's good faith mistake of
fact. Legislative adoption of the good faith defense would avoid this problem.
301 Park, 421 U.S. at 676. In Park, it was particularly difficult for the defendant to
meet this standard because he had received prior notice of the unlawful conditions and
had made only minimal efforts to remedy the violations. Id. at 677-78.
302 See FLETCHER, supra note 15, at 721; Saltzman, supra note 1, at 1621.
303 Park, 421 U.S. at 673-76.
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to prove the defense. The prosecution need not prove culpable in-
tent in its case-in-chief.
The good faith defense would operate in the same manner.
The prosecution would not be required to prove intent, or even
negligence, in a strict liability case. But, if a defendant could prove
that preventing the violation was objectively impossible because a
reasonable person in the defendant's situation would not have
known the facts making defendant's act illegal and therefore would
have no reason to prevent them, a good faith defense would be
available.
3. A Proposed American Model
The good faith defense proposed in this article is constructed
from foreign experience interpreted in light of American constitu-
tional tradition. It is designed to accommodate the interests of both
the supporters and critics of the strict liability doctrine. As such, it
recognizes society's need to expedite the prosecution of certain of-
fenses and to encourage actors to engage carefully in high risk activ-
ities. The defense is also based on the due process principle that a
defendant should not be punished criminally if that defendant is not
blameworthy-either because the defendant did not cause the crimi-
nal act or because the defendant did so accidently or due to
deception.
The good faith defense accomplishes this by viewing strict lia-
bility as a procedural device, which relieves the prosecution of the
burden of proving a culpable mens rea to obtain a conviction. By
labeling a crime a strict liability offense, the legislature creates a pre-
sumption that the defendant, by committing the unlawful act, de-
serves punishment. Yet, unlike the traditional approach to strict
liability crimes, the presumption is not irrebuttable. The defendant,
under certain circumstances, can rebut the presumption by proving
he acted in a manner that does not warrant punishment.
In order to rebut the presumption, the good faith defense
would require a defendant charged with a strict liability crime to
prove:30 4 (1) he did not have subjective knowledge of those circum-
stances rendering his act illegal; (2) he made reasonable affirmative
efforts to learn the true state of the circumstances to comply with
the law; (3) he was mistaken as to the true facts; and (4) a reasonable
304 The defendant would be required to prove these elements beyond a reasonable
doubt. This is the same standard of proof the prosecution must meet to rebut the tradi-
tional presumption that the criminal defendant is innocent until all elements of the
crime are proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the good faith defense transfers
onto the defendant the burden to prove the elements of his defense, the same standard
of proof is adopted. See infra note 326 and accompanying text.
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person in defendant's circumstances would also have been mistaken
and acted similarly. Because of the strong presumption that a de-
fendant who commits a strict liability act deserves punishment, the
defendant must prove that he made affirmative efforts to learn the
truth, but was still misled by the facts.
Operating in this manner, the good faith defense would satisfy
the interests of both proponents and opponents of the strict liability
doctrine. To satisfy the opponents of the doctrine, the defense
would allow defendants to avoid punishment by showing the ab-
sence of a link between moral culpability and criminal liability in
their cases. To satisfy the proponents of strict liability, the doctrine
would still expedite prosecutions by eliminating any need for the
prosecution to prove defendant's criminal intent as part of its case-
in-chief. The law would continue to presume, by the mere commis-
sion of an unlawful act, that the defendant was criminally culpable
for the behavior. Potential defendants would still have incentives
when engaging in high risk activities to act with all reasonable care.
Importantly, the defense is constructed in such a way as to pre-
vent every strict liability defendant from manipulating the trial into
a debate on the defendant's mental state at the time of the offense.
To prevent this from occurring, the good faith defense, like some
other affirmative defenses,30 5 would require the defendant to make
a preliminary showing to the trial judge that he can meet each re-
quirement of the defense. The defendant would have to show evi-
dence that would convince a rational trier of fact beyond a
reasonable doubt that he was unaware of the true facts surrounding
his actions, made affirmative efforts to learn the true facts, but was
misled as to the facts as any other reasonable person in a similar
situation would be. Unless the defendant could make such a show-
ing, he could not introduce evidence of mistake at trial, nor would
mens rea be an issue for the trier of fact to consider.
305 Packer, Mens Rea, supra note 1, at 144. These defenses include insanity, duress,
irresistible impulse, voluntary intoxication, and entrapment. See, e.g., United States v.
Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980) (stating that trial courts would save considerable time by
requiring testimony on duress to be proffered to the court before allowing the issue to
go to the jury); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 799 (1952) (insanity); United States v.
Pratt, 913 F.2d 982, 988 (1st Cir. 1990) (entrapment), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 681 (1991);
Wood v. Marshall, 790 F.2d 548, 550 (6th Cir. 1986) (irresistible impulse), cert. denied sub
nom, Wood v. McMackin, 479 U.S. 1036 (1987); United States ex rel. Goddard v. Vaughn,
614 F.2d 929, 935 (3d Cir.) (voluntary intoxication), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 844 (1980).
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure also provide that if an issue, including the
applicability of a defense, is capable of determination without the trial of the general
issue, it is to be raised pretrial. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12. The question of whether the defen-
dant has evidence to meet the high standards of a good faith defense can be resolved
without a trial on the credibility of that evidence. Only after the defendant makes such a
threshold showing should he be allowed to present good faith evidence at trial.
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Given this stringent test, the ordinary strict liability defendant,
such as the one charged with speeding in his vehicle, could not in-
troduce evidence of intent at trial. Merely being ignorant or mis-
taken as to one's speed would not suffice. The defense is designed
for those extraordinary situations in which the facts of the defen-
dant's case run contrary to our assumptions about strict liability
crimes.
Likewise, satisfying the defense would not be easy in sophisti-
cated strict liability crimes, such as Kantor. In Kantor, the defendants
would have to show not only that Lords appeared overage, but that
defendants made all reasonable affirmative efforts to learn her cor-
rect age. If it is reasonable to suspect that children might lie about
their ages in order to appear in these films, the producers' reliance
on Lords' representations would not be enough. Independent re-
search, such as checking certified copies of birth certificates, would
be required.30 6 The strict liability defendant would thus be required
to engage in the conduct the doctrine is designed to promote-the
exercise of extreme caution while engaging in high risk activities.
Designed as such, the good faith defense preserves those as-
pects of the strict liability doctrine that support its use. The pre-
sumption remains that defendants who commit strict liability crimes
act culpably, but the good faith defense permits an individual to re-
but this presumption when he can prove he could not prevent the
violation.
4. Fine-Tuning the Defense: Guidelines for Its Application
Understandably, courts will want to move cautiously in imple-
menting this proposed good faith defense. By creating a mens rea
defense to an offense previously thought to preclude introduction of
intent, defendants might be tempted to seek to introduce evidence
of their good intentions. If that occurred, the good faith defense
could swamp the court system, exactly the opposite result that the
legislature intended.
In order to prevent this from occurring, it is necessary to im-
pose limitations on the use of the defense. With these limitations, it
is neither inevitable nor likely that use of the good faith defense
would undermine the general use of the strict liability doctrine. As
we have seen, the commonwealth countries function quite well with
the good faith defense.30 7 The presumption remains that a defen-
dant charged with a strict liability crime acted culpably when com-
306 United States v. United States Dist. Court, 858 F.2d 534, 546 (9th Cir. 1988)
(Beezer, J., dissenting), aff'g United States v. Kantor, 677 F. Supp. 1421 (C.D. Cal.
1987).
307 See supra note 255.
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mitting the act. Oniy in the extraordinary case could the defendant
rebut that presumption.
Trial courts can quickly and effectively determine whether a de-
fendant has offered sufficient evidence to support the defense. In
criminal law, courts commonly require a defendant before trial to
proffer what evidence he intends to present to support his de-
fense.308 If the defendant's proffer is insufficient to meet the legal
requirements of the defense, the court may issue an order prohibit-
ing any introduction of evidence on the issue or argument of the
defense before the trier of fact.309
By requiring defendants to proffer evidence at pretrial and to
meet a high burden of proof, American courts have limited the use
of the "responsible share" doctrine. For example, in United States v.
Y. Hata & Co.,310 the defendants were charged with health code vio-
lations relating to the discovery of bird excrement in the their ware-
houses. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's pretrial ruling
that the defendants could not assert the impossibility defense de-
spite their attempts to keep the birds out of the warehouse. The
court held as a matter of law that a claim of powerlessness must be
accompanied by a showing that the defendant took almost all possi-
ble measures to avoid the violation.3 11 Likewise, in the companion
case of United States v. Starr,312 the court held that a defendant corpo-
ration could be responsible even for an employee's sabotage if that
violation should have been foreseen.31 3 Thus, a standard that
places the burden on the defendant to prove that he made all efforts
to prevent a violation will avoid flooding the courts with trials over
the mens rea of a strict liability defendant.
Additionally, limitations can be placed on the types of crimes
for which the good faith defense is available. Because the theoreti-
cal basis for the defense is that it is unjust to criminally punish a
defendant who is not culpable, the defense need only be available
when criminal punishment is a possible sentence. While not all
308 EDWARD CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE THE PROCEDURE OF ADMITING AND
EXCLUDING EVIDENCE ch. 6 (3d ed. 1984).
309 The United States Supreme Court has expressly sanctioned such orders in cases
in which the defendant asserts a necessity defense but fails to proffer sufficient evidence
to support that defense. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 416 (1980). As the Court
stated, "[i]f, as we here hold, an affirmative defense consists of several elements and
testimony supporting one element is insufficient to sustain it even if believed, the trial
court and the jury need not be burdened with testimony supporting other elements of
the defense." Id.
310 535 F.2d 508 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828 (1976).
311 Id. at 511.
312 535 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1976).
313 Id. at 516.
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commentators would agree,3 1 4 fines and restitution are ordinarily
seen as civil sanctions. Imprisonment, or probation with the later
possibility of imprisonment, is the type of punishment most associ-
ated with criminal culpability. 315 Thus, when the defendant in a
strict liability case does not face imprisonment, the good faith de-
fense need not be available. 3
16
Another potential limitation would place narrow parameters on
what would be considered "all reasonable efforts" that the defen-
dant must take to learn the true facts. While the question of reason-
ableness is ultimately a factual issue, the legislature or court could
create certain legal requirements. For example, by law, a defendant
would not have taken "all reasonable efforts" if:
(1) he relied absolutely on an individual whom he knew had an
interest in deceiving him;
3 17
or
(2) he has engaged in a repeated violation of the same strict liabil-
ity law using the same unreliable evidence;318
or
(3) he, in addition to making efforts to ascertain the truth, also
takes steps to avoid learning the true facts.319
Applying these requirements to the defendants in Kantor, they could
not claim the defense if they relied solely on Traci Lords' represen-
tations of her age. Moreover, if the defendants knew how to obtain
untainted evidence of Lords' age, such as a certified birth certificate,
they would be required to take such preventive measures. By set-
ting the reasonableness standard so high, defendants in these strict
314 Allen, supra note 7, at 737.
315 See supra note 20; cf MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05, cmt. 1 (1962) ("This section
makes a frontal attack on absolute or strict liability in the penal law, whenever the offense
carries a possible criminal conviction for which a sentence of probation or imprisonment may be im-
posed.") (emphasis added).
316 When efficiency is the primary interest, the legislature may enact a strict liability
statute imposing only fines and restitution as sentences. If, however, the offense calls
for imprisonment, the criminal justice system would have to spend more resources to
assure that only criminally culpable defendants are convicted.
There are parallels in criminal procedure that would support this limitation. For
example, unless a defendant faces a term of imprisonment greater than six months, he is
generally not entitled to ajury trial. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). As for
petty offenses, these crimes do not carry the same moral approbation as other criminal
laws. To the extent that they do carry unfavorable repercussions, these consequences
are outweighed by the need for speedy and inexpensive adjudications. See Baldwin v.
New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
317 Thus, as in cases like Kantor, the defendants could not turn a blind eye to the
possibility that underage actors may be trying to secure a role in their films. United
States v. United States Dist. Court, 858 F.2d 534, 542-43 (9th Cir. 1988), aff'g United
States v. Kantor, 677 F. Supp. 1421 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
318 Cf Brown v. Foot, 66 L.T.R. 649, 652 (Q.B. 1892) (Wills, J.).
319 United States v.Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976).
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liability cases will be forced to take all steps necessary to assure due
care.
Finally, the good faith defense can be tailored to require the
defendant to meet a high burden of proof-proof beyond a reason-
able doubt. In Kantor, the court selected the "clear and convincing"
evidence standard.3 20 The court selected this standard because it is
normally used to establish fraud in civil cases, 32 1 and it is the statu-
tory standard for a defendant proving an insanity defense in federal
court.3 2
2
This standard may not be high enough to preserve the integrity
of the strict liability doctrine and to prevent a flood of superficial
claims. The good faith defense is in essence a reverse presumption.
Ordinarily, we presume that a defendant who commits a particular
act is not guilty unless he does so with a culpable intent.3 23 The
presumption in strict liability cases is exactly the opposite. Requir-
ing the defendant to prove his defense beyond a reasonable doubt is
consistent with our general approach toward presumptions in crimi-
nal cases.
Additionally, pragmatic reasons exist for requiring the defen-
dant to prove his good faith efforts to comply with the law beyond a
reasonable doubt. Burdens of proof are imposed for a variety of
reasons, 324 including considerations of which party has the better
access to evidence on the issue.3 25 The strict liability defendant pos-
sesses the best evidence of efforts he made to learn the true facts of
the situation and how he was thwarted in those efforts. Also, a de-
fendant may try to exaggerate those efforts and the extent of his
mistaken impressions. Therefore, placing a high burden on the de-
fendant is justified in order to convince the trier of fact of his good
faith. The key reason for selecting this level of proof is that if strict
liability is seen as a crime with a reverse presumption-one in which
the defendant's culpability is presumed-then placing the same bur-
den on the defendant ordinarily carried by the prosecution is appro-
320 United States v. United States Dist. Court, 858 F.2d at 543.
321 Id. at 543 n.5. The court analogized the case to civil fraud laws because the
defendants were claiming that they had been defrauded by Lords and her agent.
322 Id (citing 18 U.S.C. § 17(b) (Supp. IV 1986)).
323 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES *21, cited in Sayre, supra note 1, at 55.
324 See John Quigley, The Need to Abolish Defenses to Crime: A Modest Proposal to Solve the
Problem of Burden of Persuasion, 14 VT. L. REv. 335, 359-60 (1990). The burden of proof
may be broken down into both a burden of production and a burden of persuasion. Id
at 361. For the good faith defense, the defendant would bear both burdens.
325 FLETCHER, supra note 15, at 531-32; JOHN M. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE: COMMON
SENSE AND COMMON LAW 179 (1947).
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priate.3 26 Given that the defendant can better present evidence on
his state of mind and efforts to learn the true facts, the defendant
should be able to meet this beyond a reasonable doubt standard.
Each of these devices-making the defense available only for
defendants who face incarceration, strictly defining "reasonable af-
firmative efforts," and imposing a high burden of proof on defend-
ants-would allow the good faith defense to be applied to American
strict liability prosecutions.
CONCLUSION
Courts continue to search for alternatives to avoid the harsh
consequences of the strict liability doctrine. So far, their efforts
have been awkward and limited.3 27 The good faith defense accom-
modates many of the traditional justifications for strict liability
crimes, but does so in a way that reincorporates general concepts of
blameworthiness into such prosecutions.
The best way to implement the good faith defense would be
statutory enactment so that courts could defer to legislative intent
on the issue. This will probably not occur.3 28 If anything, legisla-
tures currently are pressured to enact more strict liability crimes
where the chances for conviction are high and the costs of prosecu-
tion low.
326 "By allocating the burden of persuasion, the legal system, in effect, chooses the
preferred result in close cases." Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic
Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 257 n.215 (1982). In strict liability cases, because of the
high risk of injury from defendants' behavior, the legal system prefers that close cases be
resolved in favor of the prosecution. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. The
ordinary presumption that has been used to lessen the burden on the defendant to
prove his defense does not apply in strict liability cases. Ordinarily, the differential be-
tween the prosecution's burden and the defendant's burden is "bottomed on a funda-
mental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man
than to let a guilty man go free." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). This same presumption does not apply given the risk posed by strict liabil-
ity crimes.
327 Some courts have used the reasoning of a good faith defense, without identifying
the defense or its parameters. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 115 N.E.2d 36, 42 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1952) (truck driver with cargo of undersized fish was not guilty if he did not know
about the cargo and it would have been impracticable and unreasonable to require an
inspection); State v. Welch, 129 N.W. 656, 657 (Wis. 1911) (unwitting defendant
charged with serving oleomargarine at lunch counter without providing notice that it
was not butter; defendant's claim that objective fault was a requirement was accepted,
but court affirmed conviction because defendant did not establish a lack of opportunity
to learn the truth of the matter).
328 One area where legislatures have been inclined to draft strict liability statutes
that provide good faith defenses is in vehicle offenses, such as driving with a suspended
license. See, e.g., State v. Buttrey, 651 P.2d 1075 (Or. 1982) (Upholding OR. REv. STAT.
482.560, which shifts the burden on defendant to prove lack of knowledge as to
suspension).
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If the legislatures decline to enact the good faith defense,
courts should consider whether the Constitution demands its appli-
cation.329 The narrowly drawn standard proposed in this Article
would recognize those constitutional interests and accommodate
legislative interests in enacting strict liability crimes.
329 Case law suggests that the courts are already informally turning to a good faith
defense to address mistake of fact claims in strict liability cases. For example, in People
v. Dillard, 201 Cal. Rptr. 136 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984), the defendant claimed that his prose-
cution for possessing a loaded weapon violated due process because he was not allowed
to argue to the jury that he had reasons to believe the weapon was unloaded. After
discussing the general law that strict liability crimes are exempt from a showing of mens
rea, the court added:
Whether a good faith and reasonable mistake of fact would be a de-
fense... is not an issue presently before us. Appellant's offer of proof
was deficient in that it showed only lack of knowledge, i.e., that he was
unaware that the rifle was loaded.... A mere belief unsupported by a showing
of due care and bona fide, reasonable effort to ascertain the facts, is insufficient to
constitute a mistake offact defense.
Id at 139 (emphasis added). The Oregon Supreme Court has also noted that a law
which would punish the commission of an act that could not be prevented even with the
utmost care would probably be invalid. State v. Laundy, 103 Ore. 443 (1922); see also
Perez v. State; 803 P.2d 249 (N.M. 1990) (holding that defendant should be able to
present mistake of age defense to statutory rape when victim makes affirmative misrep-
resentation which is corroborrated by another); State v. Michlitsch, 438 N.W.2d 175
(N.D. 1989) (establishing affirmative defense to strict liability charge of possession of
marijuana; defendant has burden of proving that possession was unknowing); People v.
Hernandez, 393 P.2d 673 (Cal. 1964) (holding that reasonable but mistaken belief in age
of prosecutrix can be defense to statutory rape). Finally, a court in Pennsylvania recog-
nized that, in a case involving both vicarious liability and strict liability, not allowing a
defendant to prove that he should not be held criminally responsible for acts of which he
had no knowledge and over which he had little control would violate due process. Com-
monwealth v. Koczwara, 155 A.2d 825 (Penn. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 848 (1960).
